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Abstract
In this paper, we present a family of a control-stopping games which arise naturally in equilibrium-based
models of market microstructure, as well as in other models with strategic buyers and sellers. A distinctive
feature of this family of games is the fact that the agents do not have any exogenously given fundamental
value for the asset, and they deduce the value of their position from the bid and ask prices posted by other
agents (i.e. they are pure speculators). As a result, in such a game, the reward function of each agent,
at the time of stopping, depends directly on the controls of other players. The equilibrium problem leads
naturally to a system of coupled control-stopping problems (or, equivalently, Reflected Backward Stochastic
Differential Equations (RBSDEs)), in which the individual reward functions (or, reflecting barriers) depend
on the value functions (or, solution components) of other agents. The resulting system, in general, presents
multiple mathematical challenges due to the non-standard form of coupling (or, reflection). In the present
case, this system is also complicated by the fact that the continuous controls of the agents, describing their
posted bid and ask prices, are constrained to take values in a discrete grid. The latter feature reflects the
presence of a positive tick size in the market, and it creates additional discontinuities in the agents’ reward
functions (or, reflecting barriers). Herein, we prove the existence of a solution to the associated system in a
special Markovian framework, provide numerical examples, and discuss the potential applications.
1 Buyer-seller game
In this paper, we consider a non-zero-sum control-stopping game between two players, which can be stated in
the form {
(θa, τa) ∈ argmaxθ, τ E
(
Uaτ (θ, θ
b)1{τ≤τb} + L
a
τb(θ, θ
b)1{τ>τb}
)
(θb, τ b) ∈ argminθ, τ E
(
U bτ (θ
a, θ)1{τ≤τa} + Lbτa(θ
a, θ)1{τ>τa}
) (1)
In the above, θ is a stochastic process, referred to as continuous control; τ represents a stopping time (its exact
meaning is discussed at the end of this section); Ua, U b, La, and Lb, are exogenously given non-anticipative
random functions, mapping the paths of (θa, θb) into the so-called reward paths. The interpretation of (1) is
clear: the first player, referred to as the seller, chooses optimal control (θa, τa), and the second player, the
buyer, chooses optimal (θb, τ b). The payoff of each player depends on her individual continuous control, on
the continuous control of the other player, and on who stops first. The general class of games defined by (1) can
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be viewed as an extension of the well known Dynkin games ([8]), where the extension is due to the fact that (i)
the players can choose continuous controls, in addition to stopping times, and (ii) the game is not necessarily
zero-sum. The two-player non-zero-sum control-stopping games have been considered in [14], [15]. Other
extensions of Dynkin games can be found, e.g., in [2], [4], [11], [12], [1], [18], and the references therein.
However, the specific type of games considered herein has not been analyzed before, with the only exception
of our earlier work, [9]. Namely, we assume that θ = (p, q), with real-valued processes p, q, and
Uat (p
a, pb, qb) =
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ u
0
cas(p
a
s , p
b
s)ds
)
gau(p
a
u, p
b
u) du + exp
(
−
∫ t
0
cas(p
a
s , p
b
s)ds
)
qbt ,
Lat (p
a, qa, pb) =
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ u
0
cas(p
a
s , p
b
s)ds
)
gau(p
a
u, p
b
u) du + exp
(
−
∫ t
0
cas(p
a
s , p
b
s)ds
)
qat ,
U bt (p
a, qa, pb) =
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ u
0
cbs(p
a
s , p
b
s)ds
)
gbu(p
a
u, p
b
u) du + exp
(
−
∫ t
0
cbs(p
a
s , p
b
s)ds
)
qat ,
Lbt(p
a, pb, qb) =
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ u
0
cbs(p
a
s , p
b
s)ds
)
gbu(p
a
u, p
b
u) du + exp
(
−
∫ t
0
cbs(p
a
s , p
b
s)ds
)
qbt .
(2)
This choice has a clear economic interpretation, as a game between buyers and sellers, which is the main
motivation for our study of such problems (cf. [10], [9]). Consider a strategic buyer and a strategic seller
(or two homogeneous groups of buyers and sellers), trying to buy and sell, respectively, one unit of an asset.
Assume that the strategic agents know each other’s characteristics (e.g. because they have played this game
many times, or because they can “research” each other), but there exist other potential buyers and sellers, who
are not fully strategic, and whose characteristics are not completely known to the strategic players. An example
of such setting appears naturally in the context of market microstructure, where professional high-frequency
traders use common predictive factors and, hence, may, to some extent, predict the behavior of each other,
while the longer term investors (or, simply, less sophisticated ones) may use very different types of strategies
and, hence, are more difficult to predict. A similar game may describe the behavior of a department store
and the “bargain hunters”, representing the strategic sellers and buyers, respectively. The department store
may know fairly well the preferences (and, hence, the behavior) of the bargain hunters by conducting market
research or through past experience. However, there may also exist other potential shoppers, whose behavior
is more difficult to predict: e.g. it may be motivated more by the immediate personal needs than by the prices
and discounts. Regardless of the specific economic interpretation, the behavior of the strategic agents can be
described in the following way. The strategic agents model the arrival time of the first non-strategic agent via
an exponential random variable, independent of the past information they observed. The non-strategic agents,
despite being non-strategic, do have price preferences, hence, the arrival rate of their orders, cat or c
b
t (we allow
the strategic agents to have different beliefs about the arrival rate), depends on the prices posted by the strategic
buyers and sellers, pbt and p
a
t , respectively. The latter also affect the probability that the arriving non-strategic
agent is a buyer or a seller and, hence, will trade with the strategic seller or the strategic buyer, respectively.
The game ends whenever the first trade occurs. If the arriving non-strategic agent is a seller, then, the strategic
seller (who, in this case, is left with positive inventory at the end of the game), marks her inventory to the “new
fair price”, which is typically lower than her posted price, pa. Analogous rule applies if the non-strategic agent
is a buyer. The specific choice of such “marking to market” of the remaining inventory is discussed in the
subsequent section. The resulting profits and losses are captured by the terms ga and gb, in (2). However, the
game may also end if the strategic buyer and seller decide to trade with each other. The latter may occur if one
of them becomes sufficiently pessimistic about the arrival of a non-strategic agent of appropriate type. In this
case, they will trade at the so-called “internal” prices, qa and qb, which are not posted (and, hence, not known
to the non-strategic agents) but can be deduced by each strategic agent in equilibrium. A strategic agent who
initiates the trade accepts the price offered by the other agent: e.g. if the strategic seller initiates a trade with
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the strategic buyer, the transaction will occur at the price qb. This is captured by the last terms in the right hand
side of (2). A more detailed mathematical description of the market microstructure model leading to (1)–(2) is
presented in [9].
Let us now explain why the games in the form (1)–(2) are challenging to analyze. First of all, the fact
that such games are not zero-sum implies that the description of equilibrium through a doubly-reflected BSDE,
established, e.g., in [4], [11], is not applicable in the present case. In the absence of zero-sum property, the
existence of equilibrium is typically established via a fixed-point theorem – either using its abstract version
(cf. [14], [15], [12], [18]), or in the context of Partial Differential Equations (cf. [2]).1 In order to apply a
fixed-point theorem, one has to either rely on certain monotonicity properties of the objective, which are not
present in our case, or (a) to find a compact set of individual controls, which is sufficiently large to include
any maximizer of the objective function, and (b) to establish the continuity of the objective with respect to all
controls. However, the form of the last terms in the right hand side of (2), representing the “reward” at stopping,
makes it difficult to implement the program (a)–(b). Notice that these terms introduce expressions of the form
“qτ” into the objective. It turns out that it is very difficult to find a topology on the space of controls (q, τ),
such that the set of all admissible controls is compact and the mapping (q, τ) 7→ qτ is continuous. Note that
this issue does not arise in many cases considered in the existing literature, because the instantaneous reward
process, typically, depends on the continuous controls only through a controlled state process (cf. [14], [15]).
The latter type of dependence is more convoluted than the explicit functional dependence on the continuous
controls, given by the last terms in the right hand side of (2), but it does have a “smoothing” effect and, in many
cases, allows one to avoid the aforementioned issue of the lack of compactness or continuity. Our earlier work,
[9], shows how to construct equilibria in a version of (1)–(2), using a system of Reflected Backward Stochastic
Differential Equations (RBSDEs).
Herein, we extend our discussion of the control-stopping games in the form (1)–(2) and consider the case
where the continuous controls (pa, qa, pb, qb) are only allowed to take values in a discrete equidistant grid,
which, without loss of generality, is assumed to be Z. This restriction reflects the presence of a strictly positive
tick size in financial markets: i.e., a transaction can only occur at a price that is a multiple of the tick size. It
turns out that, in the presence of a positive tick size, the equilibrium dynamics become qualitatively different,
and the construction of equilibrium requires novel mathematical methods, as compared to the related model
of [9]. These two features constitute the main contribution of the present paper. In particular, the equilibrium
constructed herein allows for the continuation values of the two players to cross: i.e., a strategic seller may
expect to receive for his asset less than the strategic buyer expects to pay. In such a case, without the friction
caused by a positive tick size, one would naturally expect that the two strategic agents would trade with each
other at any price level lying between the two continuation values, and the game would end. The latter is indeed
the case in [9]. However, in the present model, the agents may not be able to trade with each other because there
may not exist an admissible price level (i.e. a multiple of tick size) lying between their continuation values.
In fact, such a crossing of continuation values occurs necessarily if the two strategic agents have the same
beliefs about the future order flow, in which case the game ends instantaneously in the model of [9], whereas it
typically continues in the present model. The size of such crossing (i.e., by how much the continuation value
of the buyer exceeds the continuation value of the seller) measures the inefficiency created by the positive tick
size. Namely, if the two players were offered to trade with each other in a “shadow market”, without a tick
size, the maximum fee they would be willing to pay for such an opportunity is precisely equal to the size of the
crossing. The results of the present paper allow us to compute the crossing size and to study its dependence on
the tick size. This analysis is presented in Section 5.
On the mathematical side, our main contribution is in showing how to prove the existence of equilibrium in
a game in which the individual objectives of the players depend on a discontinuous (but piece-wise continuous)
1An exception is [1], where an equilibrium is constructed explicitly. However, the latter results rely on the specific structure of the
problem, and, in particular, do not allow for continuous controls.
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function of the controlled state process, such as the “floor” and “ceiling” functions. Such dependencies appear
naturally in various games. For example, a series of attacks on a computer server does not cause any loss to its
owner until the server’s security is breached, in which case the loss jumps instantaneously. Similarly, changes
in credit quality of a borrower do not cause any loss to his creditor until the credit quality drops to a critical
value, at which the borrower defaults on his loan and the loss jumps. In the present case, it turns out that there
exists an equivalent formulation of the equilibrium problem in which the internal prices (qa, qb) of strategic
agents are given by the “floor” and “ceiling” functions of the respective continuation values, introducing a
potential discontinuity in the objectives. It is well known that the existence of a fixed point for a discontinuous
mapping is quite rare, and proving it is a very challenging task. However, if the controlled state process is
sufficiently “diffuse”,2 the discontinuities are smoothed out by the optimization. Thus, the method we propose
and implement herein is to restrict the controls of the players in such a way that (i) the controlled state process
remains sufficiently diffuse and (ii) there is no loss of optimality due to such restriction, and to show the
existence of a fixed point in the restricted set. A more detailed discussion of our implementation of this general
method is given after the statement of Theorem 1.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the control-stopping game in a Markovian
framework and obtain an alternative representation of its equilibria via an auxiliary system of coupled control-
stopping problems, in which the immediate reward process of one problem depends directly on the value
function of the other one (cf. (9)). The main result of the paper, Theorem 1, is also stated in Section 2, and
it proves the existence of a solution to the aforementioned auxiliary system (and, hence, shows the existence
of equilibrium in the proposed game). Most of the remainder of the paper is devoted to the proof of the main
result. In Section 3, we investigate the properties of the value function of an individual optimal stopping
problem faced by an agent, given the continuous controls of both agents and the other agent’s value function.
Section 3 describes the main novel mathematical ideas developed in this paper (see the discussion following
Theorem 1). In Section 4, we, first, show that the candidate optimal continuous controls in feedback form are,
indeed, optimal, and that they possess certain continuity properties. We, then, use these properties and the
results of Section 3 to prove the existence of a solution to the system of coupled control-stopping problems
derived in Section 2, via a fixed-point theorem. A numerical example, illustrating the properties of proposed
equilibrium models, and its applications, are discussed in Section 5.
2 Problem formulation and main results
The continuous controls of each agent take values in the set of integers Z, which corresponds to measuring
prices in the multiples of tick size, in the context of the market microstructure model. The information of each
agent is generated by (the same) random factor
Xt = X0 + σBt,
whereX0 ∈ R andB is a one-dimensional Brownian motion. The rest of the specifications are given in order to
determine a specific form of ca/bt and g
a/b
t , and are motivated by the model of market microstructure, discussed,
e.g., in [9]. However, most of the results described herein hold for more general ca/bt and g
a/b
t , as long as they
are given by deterministic functions of (pat , p
b
t , Xt) and the appropriate assumptions, stated further in the paper,
are satisfied.
In the proposed specification, X represents the current estimate of the “reservation price” of the non-
strategic investors. Each agent believes that the non-strategic investors arrive to the market according to a
2The precise interpretation of this term depends on the equilibrium problem at hand. Herein, we show that the continuation values of
strategic agents are given by the functions of a Brownian motion, with the first derivatives being bounded away from zero.
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Poisson processN , with intensity λ > 0, independent ofB. At any arrival time Ti ofN , the value of the actual
reservation price, p0Ti , of a non-strategic investor arriving at this time, is given by
p0Ti = XTi + ξi,
where {ξi} are i.i.d. random variables, independent of B and N , with mean 0 and c.d.f. F . An arriving non-
strategic investor submits a buy order (to the strategic seller) if and only if p0Ti ≥ paTi . Similarly, she submits a
sell order (to the strategic buyer) if and only if p0Ti ≤ pbTi . After the order of a non-strategic seller is executed
(all orders are of unit size), the remaining inventory of strategic seller (of unit size) is marked to market at the
price bXTi− + αξic. Similarly, if the non-strategic agent is a buyer, the remaining inventory of strategic buyer
is marked to market at the price dXTi− + αξie. We denote by b·c and d·e the standard “floor” and “ceiling”
functions. The parameter α ∈ (0, 1) measures the (linear) impact of a single trade on the estimated fundamental
price. The choice of this specific marking rule is justified if the bid-ask spread is equal to a single tick: in this
case, XTi−+αξi represents the new estimate of the reservation price (after the order of the non-strategic agent
is executed), and the bid and ask prices are the closest integers to this number from below and from above. The
above specification leads to the following expressions for ca/b and ga/b:
cat (p
a
t , p
b
t) = c
b
t(p
a
t , p
b
t) = c(p
a
t , p
b
t , Xt), c(p
a, pb, x) := λ
(
(1− F (pa − x)) + F (pb − x)) , (3)
gat (p
a
t , p
b
t) = g
a(pat , p
b
t , Xt), g
a(pa, pb, x) := λ
(
pa (1− F (pa − x)) + Fb(pb, x)) , (4)
gbt (p
a
t , p
b
t) = g
b(pat , p
b
t , Xt), g
b(pa, pb, x) := λ
(
pbF
(
pb − x)+ Fa(pa, x)) , (5)
Fb(pb, x) :=
∫ pb−x
−∞
bx+ αycdF (y), Fa(pa, x) :=
∫ ∞
pa−x
dx+ αyedF (y). (6)
Any strategic agent can also stop the game at any point in time by trading with the other strategic agent at the
price acceptable to the latter: qa, if the buyer initiates the trade, and qb if the seller does. This creates the optimal
stopping problems for strategic agents, with the instantaneous reward processes being equal to (discounted) qa
and qb (see (1) and (2)). Such functional dependence of the instantaneous reward process on the continuous
control of the other agent creates an additional challenge in the definition of stopping strategies. Assume, for
simplicity, that ca/b ≡ 0 and notice that, if τa > τ b, then, the payoff of the seller is qaτb . If τ b is fixed as a
stopping time (and known to the seller), then the seller can increase the value of qa around τ b, thus, making
her payoff arbitrarily large. Of course, in practice, the buyer would not accept an arbitrarily high price. Hence,
to make our game more realistic, we assume that each stopping strategy depends on the continuous control of
the other agent, so that changing qa would cause changes in τ b.
The resulting control-stopping game is given by
(pa, qa, τa) ∈ argmaxp∈Aa, q∈A, τ∈T a E
(
Uaτ(qb)(p(X), p
b(X), qb(X))1{τ(qb)≤τb(q)}
+Laτb(q)(p(X), q(X), p
b(X))1{τ(qb)>τb(q)}
)
,
(pb, qb, τ b) ∈ argminp∈Ab, q∈A, τ∈T b E
(
U bτ(qa)(p
a(X), qa(X), p(X))1{τ(qa)≤τa(q)}
+Lbτa(q)(p
a(X), p(X), q(X))1{τ(qa)>τa(q)}
)
,
(7)
where Ua/b and La/b are defined via (2) and (3)–(6); A is the space of all measurable functions from R to Z;
Aa = {p ∈ A : 1− F (p(x)− x) ≥ cl
2λ
, ∀x ∈ R}, Ab = {p ∈ A : F (p(x)− x) ≥ cl
2λ
, ∀x ∈ R}, (8)
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with some constant cl > 0; and T a and T b consist of all mappings from A into the space of FX -stopping
times, s.t.
τ ∈ T a ⇒ ∃FX -adapted process v, s.t. ∀ q ∈ A, τ(q) = inf{t ≥ 0 : q(Xt) ≥ vt},
τ ∈ T b ⇒ ∃FX -adapted process v, s.t. ∀ q ∈ A, τ(q) = inf{t ≥ 0 : q(Xt) ≤ vt}.
The above definition of stopping strategies reflects the conclusion of the paragraph preceding (7) and implies
that an agent’s stopping rule is of “threshold” type: she stops whenever the continuous control of the other
agent (i.e. the quoted price) becomes sufficiently attractive. One can uniquely define any τ in T a or in T b
by specifying the associated threshold v. We will, therefore, sometimes, use the notation τv . Clearly, for any
fixed q ∈ A, any FX -stopping time can be represented as τv(q), with an appropriately chosen v. The sets of
admissible posted prices, Aa/b, are chosen to ensure that the rate of the order flow from non-strategic agents,
c(pa, pb, x) (given in (3)), is bounded away from zero.3
To ensure that the optimal continuous control of each agent is well-behaved, we make the following as-
sumption (compare to Assumptions 2–5 in [9]).
Assumption 1. The distribution of ξ has density f , bounded from above by a constant Cf > 0, whose support
is convex and contained in [−C0, C0], for some constant C0 > 0. Furthermore, in the interior of the support,
f is continuous, (1− F )/f is non-increasing, and F/f is non-decreasing.
Remark 1. Assumption 1 can be relaxed so that (1−F )/f is only required to be non-increasing in the interior
of supp(f)∩R+, and F/f is non-decreasing in the interior of supp(f)∩R−. This would require a minor change
in the modeling assumptions: namely, an external buy order can only arrive at a positive jump of p0, and an
external sell can only arrive at a negative jump of p0 (in addition to p0 ≥ pa and p0 ≤ pb, respectively). The
latter setting is used in [9], but we choose to avoid it here, in order to streamline the notation. In addition, as
discussed in the remark following Assumption 5 in [9], a sufficient condition for Assumption 1 can be stated in
terms of the log-concavity of f .
As discussed in the introduction, games in the form (1)–(2) cannot be analyzed directly using standard
methods. Thus, our first goal is to find a more convenient system of equations describing a sub-class of equi-
libria of (7). To this end, we recall the notion of a value function, which represents the supremum or infimum
(whichever one is appropriate) of the objective value of an agent over all admissible controls. It is easy to
deduce that this value depends only on the initial condition X0. Let us denote by V¯ a(x) and V¯ b(x) the value
functions of the seller and the buyer, respectively, given X0 = x. It is natural to expect that, in equilibrium,
qa(x) ≥ V¯ a(x) and qb(x) ≤ V¯ b(x): the optimal prices at which the agents are willing to trade immediately
should not be worse than the execution price they expect to receive if they act optimally. Since the prices take
integer values, we conclude: qa(x) ≥ dV¯ a(x)e and qb(x) ≤ bV¯ b(x)c. Then, it is suboptimal for any agent to
stop unless either V¯ b(Xt) ≥ dV¯ a(Xt)e or V¯ a(Xt) ≤ bV¯ b(Xt)c. Notice that each of the latter two inequali-
ties describes the same event: the interval [V¯ a(Xt), V¯ b(Xt)] contains at least one integer. Then, it is optimal
for each strategic agent to trade with the other one at the price given by any integer in this interval, and it is
suboptimal for at least one of them to trade at any other price. If such integer is unique, we obtain the unique
threshold price such that the agents stop (simultaneously) when their value functions reach this threshold. This
heuristic discussion motivates the search for an equilibrium of (7) via the auxiliary system of coupled control
problems: find pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab, and measurable V¯ a and V¯ b, such that{
V¯ a(x) = supp∈Aa, τ J
a
(
x, τ, p, pb, V¯ b
)
= supτ J
a
(
x, τ, pa, pb, V¯ b
)
,
V¯ b(x) = infp∈Ab, τ Jb
(
x, τ, pa, p, V¯ a
)
= infτ J
b
(
x, τ, pa, pb, V¯ a
)
,
(9)
3This is a technical condition needed to ensure that the game does not last too long, and, as a result, the agents’ value functions do not
deviate too far from X (see, e.g., (13) and the proof of Lemma 2).
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where τ changes over all FX -stopping times, and
Ja
(
x, τ, pa, pb, v
)
= Ex
[ ∫ τ
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(pa(Xs), p
b(Xs), Xs)ds
)
ga(pa(Xt), p
b(Xt), Xt)dt
+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(pa(Xs), p
b(Xs), Xs)ds
)
bv(Xτ )c
]
,
(10)
Jb
(
x, τ, pa, pb, v
)
= Ex
[ ∫ τ
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(pa(Xs), p
b(Xs), Xs)ds
)
gb(pa(Xt), p
b(Xt), Xt)dt
+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(pa(Xs), p
b(Xs), Xs)ds
)
dv(Xτ )e
]
,
(11)
with Ex[·] = E [·|X0 = x].
Proposition 1. Assume that (pa, pb, V¯ a, V¯ b), solve (9), and that (V¯ a, V¯ b) are continuous and increasing.
Then, (pa, dV¯ ae, τ V¯ a) and (pb, bV¯ bc, τ V¯ b) form an equilibrium of (7).
Proof:
The proof consists of elementary verification that the proposed strategies are optimal for the agents in
(7). Consider the strategic seller. From the fact that qb = bV¯ bc ≤ V¯ a, we easily deduce that the maximum
objective value of the seller in (7) does not exceed V¯ a, provided that the other agent uses the strategy given in
the statement of the proposition. As V¯ b ≤ dV¯ ae = pa, it is easy to see that the agents using the prescribed
strategies, in (7), both stop at the stopping time τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : V¯ a(Xt) = bV¯ b(Xt)c}, and that the
resulting objective value of the seller in (7) coincides with the associated value of (10). The continuity and
monotonicity of V¯ a and V¯ b imply: V¯ a(Xτ∗) = bV¯ b(Xτ∗)c, whenever τ∗ <∞. Then, the standard arguments
in optimal stopping theory yield that the associated value of (10) is optimal and, hence, coincides with V¯ a.
Similar arguments apply to the strategic buyer.
The above proposition shows that the problem of constructing an equilibrium of (7) reduces to solving (9).
The latter is a system of two Markovian control-stopping optimization problems, coupled through continuous
controls and stopping barriers, with each barrier given by a discontinuous function (i.e. floor or ceiling) of the
other agent’s value function. Even in the present one-dimensional Brownian setting, the associated fixed-point
problem lacks the desired continuity or monotonicity properties, rendering it intractable by general methods.
Nevertheless, the following theorem establishes the existence of a solution to (9). In addition, its proof, pre-
sented in Sections 3 and 4, and the discussions in Section 5 shed more light on the structure of the solution.
Theorem 1. For any Cf , C0 > 0, any c.d.f. F , satisfying Assumption 1, and any cl, λ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), there
exists σ¯ > 0, such that, for any σ ≥ σ¯, there exists a solution (pa, pb, V¯ a, V¯ b) to (9), with (V¯ a, V¯ b) being
continuous and increasing.4
Let us outline the proof of Theorem 1. First, we notice that the RBSDE approach of [9] cannot be used in
this case. Indeed, the domain of reflection for the associated system of RBSDEs is non-convex and discontin-
uous (see Section 5), and, to date, no existence results are available for such systems. Thus, we pursue a direct
approach, aiming to show that the mapping (va, vb) 7→ (Ja, Jb) 7→ (V¯ a, V¯ b), where the first mapping is via
(10)–(11) and the second is via (9), has a fixed point. As mentioned in the introduction, the main challenge of
this approach is due to the presence of the “floor” and “ceiling” functions in the definition of Ja and Jb, which
introduces discontinuity. We propose the following general methodology for addressing this difficulty (which
4It is worth mentioning that the proof of Theorem 1, in fact, shows the existence of a Markov perfect (or, sub-game perfect) equilibrium,
in the sense that, if the agents re-evaluate their objectives at any intermediate time, the proposed strategies would still form an equilibrium.
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can be applied in many problems with similar types of discontinuities). This approach is based on the observa-
tion that the “floor” and “ceiling” operators can be made continuous, in the appropriate sense, if restricted to a
set of functions that are “sufficiently noisy” (see [7], [17], for another application of this observation). Notice
that bv(X)c is the instantaneous reward process for the optimal stopping problem of the seller. Denote the
corresponding optimal stopping time by τ . Next, consider a small perturbation v˜ of v in the uniform topology.
Assume that the process v(X) is sufficiently noisy, in the sense that, for any ε > 0, there exists a stopping
time τε, such that v(Xτε) ≥ v(Xτ ) + ε and τε ↓ τ as ε ↓ 0 (e.g., Brownian motion satisfies this property).
Then, bv˜(Xτε)c ≥ bv(Xτ )c holds, provided ‖v˜ − v‖ < ε. Since the running rewards are continuous in time
and τε is close to τ , we can find a stopping time for the perturbed problem that produces the objective value
close to the optimal objective value of the unperturbed problem. Interchanging the two problems, we conclude
that the value functions of the two problems are close, which yields the desired continuity of the mapping
(va, vb) 7→ (Ja, Jb) 7→ (V¯ a, V¯ b). Then, restricting the latter mapping to a compact, on which va/b(X) are
guaranteed to be sufficiently noisy, we can apply Schauder’s theorem to obtain a fixed point.
We emphasize that this strategy is quite general and can be applied outside the scope of the present problem.
However, in order to apply Schauder’s theorem, one needs to show that the chosen compact is preserved by
the mapping: in particular, that sufficiently noisy va/b(X) are mapped into sufficiently noisy V¯ a/b(X). The
proof of the latter may depend on the structure of a problem at hand. In the present case, we provide such
a proof in Section 3, by utilizing the geometric approach of [6], [5], which can be applied to rather irregular
linear diffusion stopping problems. It allows us to show that V¯ a/b(·) have derivatives bounded away from
zero, provided (va(·), vb(·)) satisfy this property and the volatility σ of the underlying processX is sufficiently
large (Proposition 4).5 The latter, in turn, implies that V¯ a/b(X) are sufficiently noisy, in the above sense, and
Proposition 5 uses this conclusion to prove the continuity of (va, vb) 7→ (Ja, Jb) 7→ (V¯ a, V¯ b).
Most of Section 4 is concerned with the characterization of the optimal continuous controls in a feedback
form (Proposition 6) and showing the regularity of the feedback functionals. Typically, such characterization is
obtained via PDE or BSDE methods, but the latter cannot be applied in the present case (i.e. the well-posedness
of the associated equations is not known) due to irregularity of the stopping reward processes. The proof of
Theorem 1 is concluded by combining Proposition 6 and Theorem 2.
3 Agents’ optimal stopping problems
In this section, we investigate the properties of an individual agent’s value function, given that the continuous
controls of both agents, and the other agent’s value function, are fixed. In other words, we consider the value
function of an individual optimal stopping problem. We first establish its basic relative boundedness and quasi-
periodicity properties. Then, we recall the analytic machinery of second order ODEs associated with linear
diffusions, which, together with the geometric approach to optimal stopping of [6], [5], allows us to establish
a sufficiently strong monotonicity of the value function of an agent’s optimal stopping problem. Finally, the
established monotonicity, relative boundedness, and quasi-periodicity, allow us prove the continuity of the
value function with respect to the value function of the other agent (for a fixed continuous control), which is
the main result of this section, stated in Proposition 5.
3.1 Preliminary constructions
In view of Assumption 1 and the definition of (Aa,Ab), it is no loss of generality to assume that pa ∈ Aa and
pb ∈ Ab satisfy
‖pa(x)− x‖∞ ≤ C,
∥∥pb(x)− x∥∥∞ ≤ C, (12)
5As follows from Proposition 4, σ has to be sufficiently large to ensure that w(σ) < 1, where w is defined in Proposition 2.
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with some fixed constant C > 0 (depending only on (cl, λ, F )), where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes L∞ norm (i.e. the
agents’ maximum objective values would not change with such a restriction). In addition, for any pa ∈ Aa and
pb ∈ Ab, we have:
c(pa(x), pb(x), x) ≥ cl, ∀x ∈ R. (13)
From the definition of c, and as λ is fixed throughout the paper, we obtain
c(pa(x), pb(x), x) ≤ cu = 2λ > 0.
Another property we will frequently use is the following.
Definition 1. A measurable function f : R→ R is “C-close to x”, if
‖f(x)− x‖∞ ≤ C, ∀x ∈ R,
with the constant C appearing in (12).
Using the above property we define the notion of admissible barrier: i.e. function v, such that the reward
function in the associated optimal stopping problem arises as a rounding of v.
Definition 2. A function v : R→ R is an admissible barrier if it is measurable and C-close to x.
Next, we introduce the value functions of the optimal stopping problems faced by the agents:
V a
(
x, pa, pb, v
)
:= sup
τ
Ja
(
x, τ, pa, pb, v
)
, ∀x ∈ R, (14)
V b
(
x, pa, pb, v
)
:= inf
τ
Jb
(
x, τ, pa, pb, v
)
, ∀x ∈ R, (15)
for pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab, and admissible barrier v. It is easy to see these value functions are well-defined
and finite. Note that pa, pb, V¯ a, V¯ b and x are measured in ticks, and only the relative measurements are
interpretable. Hence the following ansatz for an equilibrium is natural:
V¯ a(x+ 1) = V¯ a(x) + 1, V¯ b(x+ 1) = V¯ b(x) + 1, pa(x+ 1) = pa(x) + 1, pb(x+ 1) = pb(x) + 1. (16)
Let us introduce a special term for the above property.
Definition 3. We say a function f : R→ R has “1-shift property” if
f(x+ 1) = f(x) + 1, ∀x ∈ R.
We will also need a version of the objective and the associated value function without floors and ceilings
in the reward function, and with x subtracted (this will be particularly important for certain approximation
arguments in Section 4). Hence, for any pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab, any stopping time τ , and any admissible barrier v,
we introduce:
Ja0 (x, τ, p
a, pb, v) =
Ex
[ ∫ τ
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(pa(Xs), p
b(Xs), Xs)ds
)(
ga(p(Xt), p
b(Xt), Xt)− c(pa(Xt), pb(Xt), Xt)Xt
)
dt
+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(pa(Xs), p
b(Xs), Xs)ds
)
(v(Xτ )−Xτ )
]
, (17)
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Jb0(x, τ, p
a, pb, v) =
Ex
[ ∫ τ
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(pa(Xs), p
b(Xs), Xs)ds
)(
gb(pa(Xt), p
b(Xt), Xt)− c(pa(Xt), pb(Xt), Xt)Xt
)
dt
+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(pa(Xs), p
b(Xs), Xs)ds
)
(v(Xτ )−Xτ )
]
, (18)
V a0 (x, p
a, pb, v) = sup
τ
Ja0 (x, τ, p
a, pb, v), (19)
V b0 (x, p
a, pb, v) = inf
τ
Jb0(x, τ, p
a, pb, v). (20)
Ultimately, we aim to show that there exists a solution of (9), (pa, pb, V¯ a, V¯ b), such that (V¯ a, V¯ b) satisfy
the 1-shift property and are C-close to x. An important first step, then, is to verify that these properties are
preserved by the mappings v 7→ V a (·, pa, pb, v) , V b (·, pa, pb, v). The following lemma shows that the 1-shift
property is preserved. Its proof follows easily after rewriting the objective in the form (22).
Lemma 1. Assume that pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab, and an admissible barrier v, have 1-shift property. Then, so do
V a(·, pa, pb, v) and V b(·, pa, pb, v), while V a0 (·, pa, pb, vb) and V b0 (·, pa, pb, va) are 1-periodic. In addition,
we have
c(x+ 1, pa + 1, pb + 1) = c(x, pa, pb),
ga/b
c
(x+ 1, pa + 1, pb + 1) =
ga/b
c
(x, pa, pb) + 1,
for all x ∈ R, which means that c(·, pa(·), pb(·)) is 1-periodic and (ga/b/c)(·, pa(·), pb(·)) have the 1-shift
property.
In what follows, we will often suppress the dependence on pa(x), pb(x) from notation to avoid clutter.
Hence, we denote
c(x) := cp(x) := c(p
a(x), pb(x), x),
ga(x) := gap(x) := g
a(pa(x), pb(x), x), gb(x) := gbp(x) := g
b(pa(x), pb(x), x),
Fb(x) := Fbp(x) :=
∫ pb(x)−x
−∞
bx+ αycdF (y), Fa(x) := Fap (x) :=
∫ ∞
pa(x)−x
dx+ αyedF (y),
(21)
where we use the subscript p whenever we want to emphasize the dependence on pa, pb. The next lemma
shows that the “C-close to x” property is preserved.
Lemma 2. Assume that v is an admissible barrier, and that pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab are such that ga/b/c areC-close
to x. Then, V a(·, pa, pb, vb) and V b(·, pa, pb, va) are C-close to x, while V a0 (·, pa, pb, vb) and V b0 (·, pa, pb, va)
are absolutely bounded by C.
Proof:
We show the claim for V a, the other ones being analogous. From the definitions (14) and (10) we obtain:
V a(x, pa, pb, vb)− x = sup
τ
Ex
[∫ τ
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
)
ga(Xt)dt+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(Xs)ds
)
bvbc
]
− x
= sup
τ
Ex
[∫ τ
0
(
ga
c
(x)− x
)
d
(
− exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
))
+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bvbc − xc)] . (22)
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To get the upper bound, note that the right hand side of the above is
≤ sup
τ
Ex
[∫ τ
0
Cd
(
− exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
))
+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(Xs)ds
)
C
]
= C,
where we made use of g
a
c − x ≤ C, bvbc − x ≤ vb − x ≤ C, by the assumption of the lemma. To obtain a
lower bound, note that the same expression also is
≥ Ex
[∫ ∞
0
ga
c
(x)− xd
(
− exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
))]
≥ Ex
[∫ ∞
0
−Cd
(
− exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
))]
≥ −C,
where we used τ = ∞. The claim for V a0 and V b0 is even simpler and can be proven as in the first part of this
lemma.
In what follows, we analyze V a(x, pa, pb, v) more closely (V b(x, pa, pb, v) being analogous). Ultimately,
in Subsection 3.3, we establish its monotonicity in x and continuity in v, under appropriate conditions. Through-
out this analysis, we think of pa and pb as fixed functions of x, while we vary x and vb(va).
3.2 Representation of the value function
In this subsection, we develop a convenient representation of the value function V a(x, pa, pb, v) (cf. Proposi-
tion 3), which, along with Proposition 2, is needed to prove the main results of Subsection 3.3. We will make
heavy use of the well-known connection between linear diffusions and second-order ODEs. Our discounting
and running cost functions are a bit less regular (measurable and locally bounded, but not continuous) than is
commonly assumed in the literature, hence, a modicum of care is required to make this connection rigorous.
First, as in [13], for any given pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab, we define
ψ(x) := ψp(x) :=
{
Ex
[
exp
(− ∫ τ0
0
cp(Xs)ds
)]
, x ≤ 0,
E0
[
exp
(− ∫ τx
0
cp(Xs)ds
)]−1
, x > 0,
(23)
and
φ(x) := φp(x) :=
{
Ex
[
exp
(− ∫ τ0
0
cp(Xs)ds
)]
, x > 0,
E0
[
exp
(− ∫ τx
0
cp(Xs)ds
)]−1
, x ≤ 0, (24)
where τx is the first hitting time of x ∈ R by the process X . It is clear that ψ(0) = φ(0) = 1, ψ is strictly
increasing, and φ is strictly decreasing. The results from [13] (and the absolute continuity of the killing measure
of the diffusion, in the present case) imply that f = φ, ψ has right derivative, f+, defined everywhere, and it
satisfies
2
σ2
∫
(a,b]
c(x)f(x)dx = f+(b)− f+(a),
for all b > a. Passing to the limit as b ↓ a and a ↑ b shows that f+ is continuous. One can also show the
following.
Lemma 3. If f is continuous and has continuous right derivative on [a, b] then f ∈ C1(a, b).
The proof of this fact is elementary and, hence, is omitted. Thus, the equation for f = φ, ψ can be rewritten
as
2
σ2
∫
(a,b]
c(x)f(x)dx = f ′(b)− f ′(a) (25)
11
As c ∈ L∞(R) and f ∈ C(R), fxx exists a.e. and satisfies
σ2
2
fxx − cf = 0, a.e.,
for f = ψ, φ, and, in particular, f belongs to the Sobolev spaceW2,loc(R). Next, we define
fa(x) := fap (x) :=
2
σ2W
(
φ(x)
∫ x
−∞
ψ(y)ga(y)dy + ψ(x)
∫ ∞
x
φ(y)ga(y)dy
)
, (26)
f b(x) := f bp(x) := −
2
σ2W
(
φ(x)
∫ x
−∞
ψ(y)gb(y)dy + ψ(x)
∫ ∞
x
φ(y)gb(y)dy
)
, (27)
where the Wronskian W = ψ′(x)φ(x) − φ′(x)ψ(x) is independent of x and strictly positive. Using the fact
that x 7→ φ(x) ∫ x−∞ ψ(y)ga(y)dy (along with other similar terms) is absolutely continuous, as a product of two
absolutely continuous functions, we conclude that fa has continuous derivative
2
σ2W
(
φ′(x)
∫ x
−∞
ψ(y)ga(y)dy + ψ′(x)
∫ ∞
x
φ(y)ga(y)dy
)
,
which is, in turn, a.e. differentiable, and furthermore
σ2
2
faxx − cfa = −ga, a.e. (28)
Similar claims hold for f b. This, in particular, implies that fa and f b belong toW2,loc(R). Applying Dynkin’s
formula, together with some obvious asymptotic properties of exp
(
− ∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
)
fa(Xt), we pass to the
limit along a sequence of increasing to infinity stopping times, to obtain the following probabilistic representa-
tion
fa(x) = Ex
[∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
)
ga(Xt)dt
]
. (29)
Similar representation holds for f b. Finally, we establish the following elementary bounds on φ, ψ (whose
proof is also omitted).
Lemma 4. Let cl > 0 (cu > 0) be the lower (resp. upper) bound of function c. Then, for all x ∈ R,
ψ(x) ≤ exp
(√
2cl
σ2
x
)
∨ exp
(√
2cu
σ2
x
)
and
φ(x) ≤ exp
(
−
√
2cl
σ2
x
)
∨ exp
(
−
√
2cu
σ2
x
)
.
Next, we show that fa and f b inherit the C-closeness to x and 1-shift properties from pa and pb.
Lemma 5. Assume that pa ∈ Aa and pb ∈ Ab are such that ga/b/c are C-close to x. Then, so are fa and f b.
Proof:
The claim about fa follows from
fa(x)− x = Ex
[∫ ∞
0
(
ga
c
(Xt)−Xt
)
d
(
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
))]
. (30)
Similarly for f b.
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Lemma 6. If pa ∈ Aa and pb ∈ Ab have 1-shift property, then so do fa and f b.
Proof:
Follows from the representation (30) and Lemma 1.
It turns out that the 1-shift property of pa and pb implies that fa and f b converge to f0 : x 7→ x in C1-
norm, as the volatility σ of the underlying diffusion X increases to infinity. In particular, we can establish the
following two-sided estimate on the derivatives of fa and f b.
Proposition 2. Assume that pa ∈ Aa and pb ∈ Ab have 1-shift property, and are such that ga/b/c are C-close
to x. Then, there exists a function (C, cl, cu, σ) 7→ w(C, cl, cu, σ), such that
1− w ≤ (fa/b)′(x) ≤ 1 + w, ∀x ∈ R, (31)
and
w(σ)→ 0, as σ →∞. (32)
Proof:
We only show the upper bound on the derivative of fa, the proof of the other parts being analogous.
Differentiating the representation (26), we obtain
(fa)
′
(x) =
|φ′(x)|ψ′(x)
W
(∫ ∞
x
ga
c
(y)φ(y)c(y)
2
σ2|φ′(x)|dy −
∫ x
−∞
ga
c
(y)ψ(y)c(y)
2
σ2ψ′(x)
dy
)
. (33)
As our diffusion X , killed at the rate c(x) − cl, has ±∞ as natural boundary points, the results of [13] imply
φ′(−∞) = 0, ψ′(∞) = 0. Hence, passing to the appropriate limits in (25), we obtain
ψ′(x) =
2
σ2
∫ x
−∞
ψ(y)c(y)dy (34)
and
φ′(x) = − 2
σ2
∫ ∞
x
φ(y)c(y)dy. (35)
From the representations above, we see that the function y 7→ 2φ(y)c(y)/(σ2|φ′(x)|) is a probability density on
[x,∞), and that y 7→ 2ψ(y)c(y)/(σ2ψ′(x)) is a probability density on (−∞, x]. Using this and the inequality
ga(x)c(x) ≤ x+ C, we obtain
(fa)
′
(x) ≤ 2C |φ
′(x)|ψ′(x)
W
+
(
f˜a
)′
(x).
where f˜a(x) is defined as fa(x), with ga(x) replaced by g˜a(x) := xc(x). In particular, f = f˜a is the unique
solution of
σ2
2
f ′′(x)− c(x)f(x) = −xc(x),
which is easily seen to be given by f˜a(x) = x. Hence,
(
f˜a
)′
= 1, and we conclude:
(fa)
′
(x) ≤ 1 + 2C |φ
′(x)|ψ′(x)
W
.
Thus, to prove the claim, it only remains to establish the appropriate bound on the last summand in the above.
To this end, we, first, notice that c(x + 1) = c(x), due to Lemma 1, which implies: φ(x + 1) = γφ(x) and
13
ψ(x+1) = 1γψ(x), with 0 < γ = φ(1) < 1. Hence, x 7→ |φ′(x)|ψ′(x) is 1-periodic, and it suffices to estimate
2C|φ′(x)|ψ′(x)/W for x ∈ [0, 1]. To this end, recall that
|φ′(x)| = 2
σ2
∫ ∞
x
c(y)φ(y)dy.
For x ≥ 0, using Lemma 4 and the bounds on c, we conclude that the right hand side of the above expression
is bounded from above by
2cu
σ2
∫ ∞
x
exp
(
−
√
2cl
σ2
y
)
dy =
2cu
σ
√
2cl
exp
(
−
√
2cl
σ2
x
)
.
Combined with a similar estimate from below, the above yields:
2cl
σ
√
2cu
exp
(
−
√
2cu
σ2
x
)
≤ |φ′(x)| ≤ 2cu
σ
√
2cl
exp
(
−
√
2cl
σ2
x
)
, (36)
for x ≥ 0. Similarly, for x ≤ 0, we obtain
2cl
σ
√
2cu
exp
(√
2cu
σ2
x
)
≤ |ψ′(x)| ≤ 2cu
σ
√
2cl
exp
(√
2cl
σ2
x
)
,
which, using ψ′(x+ 1) = 1γψ
′(x), gives
1
γ
2cl
σ
√
2cu
exp
(√
2cu
σ2
(x− 1)
)
≤ |ψ′(x)| ≤ 1
γ
2cu
σ
√
2cl
exp
(√
2cl
σ2
(x− 1)
)
, (37)
for x ∈ [0, 1]. Combining the above and replacing the exponential terms with their worst-case bounds, we
conclude:
|φ′(x)|ψ′(x) ≤ 1
γ
(
2cu
σ
√
2cl
)2
, x ∈ [0, 1].
Note that on [0, 1], we have γ ≤ φ ≤ 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1/γ, which, together with the above estimates of |φ′| and ψ′,
gives, for x ∈ [0, 1],
W = φψ′ + ψ|φ′| ≥ γ ·
(
1
γ
2cl
σ
√
2cu
exp
(√
2cu
σ2
(x− 1)
))
+ 1 · 2cl
σ
√
2cu
exp
(
−
√
2cu
σ2
x
)
≥
4cl
σ
√
2cu
exp
(
−
√
2cu
σ2
)
, (38)
and, in turn,
|φ′(x)|ψ′(x)
W
≤ 1
σ
1
γ
(
2cu√
2cl
)2 √
2cu
4cl
exp
(√
2cu −
√
2cl
σ
)
, x ∈ [0, 1].
Finally, we notice that, as ψ(1) = 1/γ, the bound on ψ in Lemma 4 implies
1
γ
≤ exp
(√
2cu
σ2
)
.
This, together with the previous inequality, implies the desired upper bound on 2C|φ′(x)|ψ′(x)/W and, in
turn, on (fa)′ (x).
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Next, we establish the desired representation of the value function in terms of fa and f b, using the results
of [5]. To this end, we define
F(x) := Fp(x) :=
ψ(x)
φ(x)
, x ∈ R, (39)
and introduce the following transformation:
·̂ : h 7→ ĥ, ĥ(y) = h
φ
(F−1(y)), (40)
mapping any function h : R→ R into function ĥ : (0,∞)→ R. The following lemma, in particular, describes
the shift-property of transformed functions. Its proof is trivial and, hence, is omitted.
Lemma 7. For any pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab, satisfying the 1-shift property, we have
φ(x+ 1) = γφ(x), ψ(x+ 1) =
1
γ
ψ(x), F(x+ 1) =
1
γ2
F(x), ∀x ∈ R, (41)
where φ, ψ, F are given by (24), (23), (39), and γ = φ(1) ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
Hˆ
(
y
γ2
)
=
1
γ
Hˆ(y), ∀ y > 0, (42)
for any 1-periodic function H : R → R. In particular, by Lemma 6, the above property holds for H =
v − fa, f b − v, with any v : R→ R satisfying the 1-shift property.
Using the transformation defined by (40), we obtain the following “geometric” description of the value
function of an individual stopping problem.
Proposition 3. For any pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab, and any admissible barrier v, the functions x 7→ V a1 (x) :=
x+ V a0 (x, p
a, pb, v) and x 7→ V b1 (x) := x+ V b0 (x, pa, pb, v) are uniquely determined by
V̂ a1 (y) = mcm
̂(v − fa)(y) + f̂a(y),
V̂ b1 (y) = −mcm ̂(f b − v)(y) + f̂ b(y),
(43)
where mcm(f) denotes the smallest nonnegative concave majorant of a function f (equal to infinity, if no such
majorants exist). Similarly, the individual agents’ value functions are uniquely determined by
̂V a(·, pa, pb, v)(y) = mcm ̂(bvc − fa)(y) + f̂a(y)
̂V b(·, pa, pb, v)(y) = −mcm ̂(f b − dve)(y) + f̂ b(y)
(44)
Proof:
We only prove the claim for V a1 . First, we recall (17), to obtain
Ja0 (x, τ, p
a, pb, v) + x = Ex
[∫ τ
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
)
ga(Xt)dt+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(Xs)ds
)
v(Xτ )
]
= Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
)
ga(Xt)dt
− exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(Xs)ds
)∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xτ+s)ds
)
ga(Xτ+t)dt+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(Xs)ds
)
v(Xτ )
]
= fa(x) + Ex
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(Xs)ds
)
(v(Xτ )− fa(Xτ ))
]
,
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where the last equality follows from (29) and from the strong Markov property of X . Hence,
V a0 (x, p
a, pb, v) + x = fa(x) + sup
τ
Ex
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(Xs)ds
)
(v(Xτ )− fa(Xτ ))
]
.
As v − fa is measurable and locally bounded, the last term above (i.e., the value function of a pure stopping
problem (with discounting)) has the claimed mcm-characterization by Proposition 3.4 from [5].
3.3 Continuity via monotonicity
In this subsection, we establish the sufficiently strong monotonicity property of V a/b(·, pa, pb, v), which, in
turn, allows us to show the continuity of the mappings v 7→ V a/b(x, pa, pb, v). Note that, a priori, the latter
mappings are not continuous, as they involve the discontinuous rounding operators. However, as discussed at
the beginning of the paper, these mappings do become continuous if the process v(X) is “sufficiently noisy”.
The latter property, in particular, can be deduced from the strict monotonicity of v(·). The following proposition
shows that the desired monotonicity property in x is preserved by the mappings v 7→ V a/b(x, pa, pb, v).
Proposition 4. Assume that pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab, and admissible barrier v, have 1-shift property and are such
that ga/b/c areC-close to x. Then, V (x) = V a/b(x, pa, pb, v), x+V a/b0 (x, p
a, pb, v) is absolutely continuous,
and its derivative satisfies:
|V ′(x)− 1| ≤ w, a.e. x ∈ R, (45)
with w(σ) → 0, as σ → ∞, uniformly over all (pa, pb, v) satisfying the above properties (assuming that the
rest of the model parameters, (λ, F, α), are fixed). In particular, there exists  > 0, s.t.
V ′(x) ≥ , a.e. x ∈ R,
for all sufficiently large σ > 0.
Proof:
We only prove the lower bound on the derivative of V (x) = x + V a0 (x, p
a, pb, v), the other parts being
similar. Note that Proposition 3 implies
V (x) = fa(x) + φ(x) mcm
(
v̂ − fa
)
(F(x)), ∀x ∈ R.
Notice that fa, φ,F ∈ C1(R), and the value of “mcm” above is absolutely continuous, as it is concave (note
that it is also finite, as v − fa is absolutely bounded, due to Lemma 5, which, in turn, implies that v̂ − fa is
bounded above by an affine function). Then V is also absolutely continuous, and its (a.e. defined) derivative
satisfies:
V ′(x) = (fa)′(x) + φ′(x) mcm
(
v̂ − fa
)
(F(x)) + φ(x)F′(x) mcm
(
v̂ − fa
)′
(F(x)).
From Proposition 2, we obtain (fa)′ ≥ 1 − w, with w as in the statement of the proposition. Hence, we only
need to show that, for a.e. x ∈ R,
V ′(x)− (fa)′(x) = φ′(x) mcm
(
v̂ − fa
)
(F(x)) + φ(x)F′(x) mcm
(
v̂ − fa
)′
(F(x)) ≥ −w˜(σ), (46)
with w˜ having the appropriate asymptotic properties. Recall that, by Lemma 1, V (x) = V a0 (x) + x is 1-
periodic, hence, it suffices to consider x on any bounded interval of length at least 1, as opposed to the entire
real line. To simplify the notation, we denote
h0(y) := v̂ − fa(y), h(y) := mcm (h0) (y), ∀ y > 0.
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Note that the assumed 1-shift property of v, via Lemma 6, implies that v − fa is 1-periodic. The latter and
Lemma 7, in turn, imply that
h0(y/γ
2) = h0(y)/γ, ∀ y > 0.
It can be easily checked (using the scaling properties of mcm) that the above property passes on to the minimal
concave majorant h(y).
Next, we define
φ¯(y) := φ̂2(y) = φ(F−1(y))
It is easy to check that
(
σ2
2
∂2
∂x2 − c
)
(φ2) > 0, and, hence, φ¯ is convex by the following lemma, which can be
proven by a straightforward calculation.
Lemma 8. Let H ∈ W2,loc and −∞ < x1 < x2 < ∞ be such that σ22 Hxx − cH > 0, (resp. < 0) a.e. on
(x1, x2). Then, Ĥ is convex (resp. concave) on (y1, y2), with yi = F(xi).
Furthermore, φ¯ is decreasing and satisfies φ¯(y/γ2) = γφ¯(y). In the rest of the proof, we use the established
properties of φ¯, h0, and h, to prove the inequality in (46).
Let us define
c˜ := sup
y∈[1,1/γ2]
h0(y)φ¯(y).
Note that, as (h0φ¯)(y/γ2) = (h0φ¯)(y), we obtain
h0(y) ≤ c˜/φ¯(y),
for all y > 0 (and not just for y ∈ [1, 1/γ2]), as follows from the definition of c˜.
First, let us assume that c˜ ≤ 0. We will show that, in this case, h(y) ≡ 0, and w˜ = 0 gives the desired
lower bound in (46). Indeed, the constant function 0 is a concave majorant of h0 in this case. If there exists
y > 0 s.t. h(y) = z < 0, then, as h(y/γ2) = h(y)/γ, all points (y/γ2k, z/γk), for integer k, lie on the graph
of h. However, it is easy to see that the slope between two consecutive points in this family increases, if z < 0,
contradicting the concavity of h.
Having dealt with the simpler case of c˜ ≤ 0, we assume c˜ > 0 for the rest of the proof. As
h0(y)φ¯(y) = (v − fa) (F−1(y)),
and v and fa are C-close to x (see Lemma 5), we conclude that c˜ ≤ 2C. Moreover, 1/φ¯(y) = 1ˆ (i.e., the “ ·̂ ”
transform applied to a constant function 1) is concave by the previous lemma, as(
σ2
2
d2
dx2
− c
)
(1) < 0.
Hence, c˜/φ¯ is a concave majorant of h0. It is also shown above that h ≥ 0. These observations imply
0 < h(y) ≤ c˜/φ¯(y), ∀y ∈ (0,∞).
From the definition of c˜, we can find an infinite sequence of points {yi} in [1, 1/γ2] s.t. (h0φ¯)(yi) → c˜. Let
y∗ be any concentration point of this sequence. Then, from the continuity of the concave majorant h, and by
h ≤ c˜/φ¯, we obtain
h(y∗) = c˜/φ¯(y∗).
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Recall that we only need to establish (46) on some x-interval of length ≥ 1. It is convenient to use the x-
interval corresponding (via F−1) to the y-interval [y∗, y∗/γ2]. Note that, as y∗ ∈ [1, 1/γ2], the resulting
x-interval necessarily lies inside [0, 2]. Note also that
φ(x) = φ¯(F(x)), φ′(x) = φ¯′(F(x))F′(x),
and, hence, the left hand side of (46) can be rewritten as
F′(x)
(
φ¯′(F(x))h(F(x)) + φ¯(F(x))h′(F(x))
)
. (47)
As F′ ≥ 0, to estimate (47) from below, for x ∈ [0, 2], we will derive an estimate for
φ¯′(y)h(y) + φ¯(y)h′(y), (48)
for y ∈ [y∗, y∗/γ2] ⊂ [1, 1/γ4]. As φ¯′ ≤ 0, h > 0, and, as shown below, h′ > 0, we will estimate φ¯, h′
from below, and h from above. Clearly, φ¯(y) ≥ γ2, for y ∈ [1, 1/γ4]. In addition, as h ≤ c˜/φ¯, we obtain
h(y) ≤ c˜/γ2, in the y-range we consider.
To estimate h′ on [y∗, y∗/γ2], note that h(y) coincides with c˜/φ¯(y) at the endpoints of this interval, and
h ≤ c˜/φ¯ on the entire interval. Then, as c˜/φ¯ is differentiable, we must have(
c˜
φ¯
)′(
y∗
γ2
)
≤ h′
(
y∗
γ2
)
,
as, otherwise, we get a contradiction with the domination relationship between the two functions in the left
neighborhood of y∗/γ2. In the above, and in the rest of the argument, h′(y) is understood as the left derivative
at y = y∗/γ2, as the right derivative at y = y∗, and as any element in the superdifferential at y ∈ (y∗, y∗/γ2).
The last inequality, together with the concavity of h, implies that, for all y ∈ [y∗, y∗/γ2],
h′(y) ≥
(
c˜
φ¯
)′(
y∗
γ2
)
= − c˜
φ¯2(y∗/γ2)
φ¯′(y∗/γ2) ≥ − c˜
γ2
φ¯′(y∗/γ2).
Note further that, as y∗/γ2 ≤ y/γ2, for any y ∈ [y∗, y∗/γ2], and as −φ¯′ is nonnegative and decreasing (due to
convexity and monotonicity of φ¯), we obtain
− c˜
γ2
φ¯′(y∗/γ2) ≥ − c˜
γ2
φ¯′(y/γ2) = −c˜γφ¯′(y), y ∈ [y∗, y∗/γ2],
where we also used φ¯′(y/γ2) = γ3φ¯′(y).
The above inequalities imply a lower bound for (48) in terms of φ¯′. Passing on to (47), we obtain, for
x ∈ [F−1(y∗),F−1(y∗) + 1]:
F′(x)
(
φ¯′(F(x))h(F(x)) + φ¯(F(x))h′(F(x))
)
≥ F′(x)
(
φ¯′(F(x))
c˜
γ2
− c˜γφ¯′(F(x))
)
= F′(x)φ¯′(F(x))c˜
(
1
γ2
− γ3
)
. (49)
As F′(x)φ¯′(F(x)) = φ′(x) ≥ φ′(0) and c˜ ≤ 2C, the right hand side of the above is
≥ φ′(0)2C
(
1
γ2
− γ3
)
.
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The value of φ′(0) can be estimated using its integral representation, as in the proof of Proposition 2, using the
asymptotic properties of φ from Lemma 4. As a result, we obtain:
φ′(0) ≥ − 2cu
σ
√
2cl
.
In addition, Lemma 4 implies
1 ≤ exp
(√
2cl
σ2
)
≤ 1
γ
≤ exp
(√
2cu
σ2
)
.
Collecting the above, we conclude that the right hand side of (49) vanishes, as σ → ∞, at a rate depending
only on cl, cu. This, in turn, yields (46) and completes the proof of the proposition.
Recall that our ultimate goal is to prove existence of a fixed point for a mapping which involves v 7→
V a/b(x, pa, pb, v). As announced at the beginning of this subsection, in order to establish the continuity of the
latter, we need to restrict v to a set of sufficiently monotone functions. Proposition 4 shows that the desired
monotonicity property in x is preserved by v 7→ V a/b(x, pa, pb, v), and the following proposition, in turn,
shows that the latter mapping is continuous on the set of such v.
Proposition 5. Assume that pa ∈ Aa, pb ∈ Ab, and admissible barriers v1, v2, have 1-shift property and are
such that ga/b/c are C-close to x. Assume also that (v1)′(x), (v2)′(x) ≥  > 0, for all x ∈ R. Then, there
exists a function ε : R+ → R+ (depending only on (, σ, λ, F, α), but independent of (pa, pb, v1, v2), satisfying
the above assumptions), such that ε(δ)→ 0, as δ → 0, and
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣V a/b(x, pa, pb, v1)− V a/b(x, pa, pb, v2)∣∣∣ ≤ ε(sup
x∈R
|v1(x)− v2(x)|
)
. (50)
Proof:
We will prove the statement for V a, the one for V b being similar. We will show that, whenever supx∈R |v1(x)−
v2(x)| ≤ δ, we have V a(x, pa, pb, v1) ≥ V a(x, pa, pb, v2)−ε(δ), with ε vanishing at zero. This, together with
the symmetric inequality (proved analogously), yields the statement of the proposition.
For a given δ > 0, consider a δ-optimal τ2, such that
Ja(τ2, x, p
a, pb, v2) ≥ V a(x, pa, pb, v2)− δ.
Notice that it suffices to find τ1, such that
Ja(τ1, x, p
a, pb, v1) ≥ Ja(τ2, x, pa, pb, v2)− ε(δ).
Throughout this proof, ε may change from line to line, but it always satisfies the properties stated in the
proposition. We construct τ1 ≥ τ2, separately, on two different Fτ2 -measurable sets. On the event
Ω1 :=
{
ω : bv1(Xτ2)c ≥ bv2(Xτ2)c
}
,
we set τ1 = τ2. If bv1(Xτ2)c < bv2(Xτ2)c, we, nevertheless, have
v1(Xτ2) ≥ v2(Xτ2)− δ,
and, hence, by the assumption on (v1)′,
v1
(
Xτ2 +
δ

)
≥ v2(Xτ2).
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The above implies
bv1 (Xτ2 + δ/)c ≥ bv2(Xτ2)c. (51)
Then, on the event
Ω2 := Ω
c
1 =
{
ω : bv1(Xτ2)c < bv2(Xτ2)c
}
,
we define
τ10 := inf
{
t ≥ τ2 : Xt ≥ Xτ2 +
δ

}
, τ11 := inf {t ≥ τ2 : Xt ≤ Xτ2 − 1} , τ1 := τ10 ∧ τ11.
In the subsequent derivations, we express various quantities in terms of the following expression, which can be
interpreted as the “relative to x” objective value, and which is more convenient than its “absolute” version.
Ja(τ, x, pa, pb, vi)− x = Ex
[∫ τ
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
)
(ga(Xt)− c(Xt)Xt) dt
+ exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bvi (Xτ )c −Xτ)] , (52)
where
∣∣bvi(x)c − x∣∣ ≤ C + 1 and |ga(x) − c(x)x| ≤ cuC, by the assumption of the proposition. Using the
above expression, we obtain
Ja(τ1, x, p
a, pb, v1)− Ja(τ2, x, pa, pb, v2) = Ex
[
1Ω1 exp
(
−
∫ τ2
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv1(Xτ2)c − bv2(Xτ2)c)
+ 1Ω2
∫ τ1
τ2
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
)
(ga(Xt)− c(Xt)Xt) dt
+ 1Ω2
(
exp
(
−
∫ τ1
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv1 (Xτ1)c −Xτ1)− exp(−∫ τ2
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv2 (Xτ2)c −Xτ2)) ].
Note that the first one of the three summands, inside the above expectation, is nonnegative for every ω, by
the definition of Ω1. Note also that, as |ga(x) − c(x)x| ≤ cuC, we have the following bound for the second
summand:∣∣∣∣Ex [1Ω2 ∫ τ1
τ2
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs)ds
)
(ga(Xt)− c(Xt)Xt) dt
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ cuCEx|τ1 − τ2| = cuCE0τ ′ =: ε(δ),
where
τ ′ := inf {t ≥ 0: Xt /∈ (−1, δ/)} ,
and E0τ ′ is easily seen to go to zero as O(δ), as δ → 0. It only remains to estimate the expectation of the last
summand,which can be decomposed as
Ex
[
1Ω21{τ1=τ10}
(
exp
(
−
∫ τ10
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv1 (Xτ10)c −Xτ10)
− exp
(
−
∫ τ2
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv2 (Xτ2)c −Xτ2))
+1Ω21{τ1=τ11}
(
exp
(
−
∫ τ11
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv1 (Xτ11)c −Xτ11)− exp(−∫ τ2
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv2 (Xτ2)c −Xτ2)) ].
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As |vi(x)− x| ≤ C, for all x ∈ R, and as
Px (τ1 = τ11) = P0
(
inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Xt = δ

}
> inf {t ≥ 0 : Xt = −1}
)
=
δ/
1 + δ/
= O(δ),
for δ → 0, we obtain:∣∣∣∣Ex[1Ω21{τ1=τ11}(exp(−∫ τ11
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv1 (Xτ11)c −Xτ11)
− exp
(
−
∫ τ2
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv2 (Xτ2)c −Xτ2)) ]∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(C + 1)Px(τ1 = τ11) =: ε(δ).
Finally, we estimate the remaining term from below:
Ex
[
1Ω21{τ1=τ10}
(
exp
(
−
∫ τ10
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv1 (Xτ10)c −Xτ10)
− exp
(
−
∫ τ2
0
c(Xs)ds
)(bv2 (Xτ2)c −Xτ2))
≥ Ex
[
1Ω21{τ1=τ10}
( (bv2(Xτ2)c −Xτ2)(exp(− ∫ τ10
0
c(Xs)ds
)
− exp
(
−
∫ τ2
0
c(Xs)ds
))
+ (Xτ2 −Xτ10) exp
(
−
∫ τ10
0
c(Xs)ds
))]
≥ −(C + 1)Ex
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ2
0
c(Xs)ds
)
− exp
(
−
∫ τ1
0
c(Xs)ds
)]
− δ

,
where the first inequality follows from bv1(Xτ10)c = bv1(Xτ2 + δ/)c ≥ bv2(Xτ2)c, by (51), and the second
inequality follows fromXτ2−Xτ10 = −δ/ and |bv2(x)c−x| ≤ C+1, together with τ1 ≥ τ2. It only remains
to notice that∣∣∣∣Ex [exp(−∫ τ2
0
c(Xs)ds
)
− exp
(
−
∫ τ1
0
c(Xs)ds
)]∣∣∣∣ ≤
Ex
∣∣∣∣∫ τ1
τ2
c(Xs)ds
∣∣∣∣ ≤ cuEx|τ1 − τ2| = O(δ),
which concludes the proof.
4 Optimization over continous controls and existence of equilibrium
In this section, we, first, address the continuous control part of each agent’s optimization problem. Namely,
we introduce the feedback control operators and show that the controls they produce are indeed optimal. Our
situation is somewhat less regular than the one treated in standard references, hence, we need to exploit the spe-
cial structure of the problem and develop additional tricks to show this optimality. We, then, prove that these
response control operators are continuous in the appropriate topology and show how the system of coupled op-
timization problems (9) reduces to a fixed point problem of a certain mapping. Finally, we show the continuity
of this mapping and the existence of its fixed point, satisfying the desired properties, which completes the proof
of Theorem 1.
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For any measurable v : R→ R, we define the following feedback control operators:
P a(v)(x) := min argmaxp∈Aa(x) (p− v(x))F+ (p− x) , x ∈ R,
P b(v)(x) := max argmaxp∈Ab(x) (v(x)− p)F (p− x) , x ∈ R,
(53)
where, for x ∈ R, we denote
Aa(x) := {p ∈ Z : 1− F (p− x) ≥ cl
2λ
}, Ab(x) = {p ∈ Z : F (p− x) ≥ cl
2λ
}, F+(x) := 1− F (x),
with the c.d.f. F (cf. (8)). It is clear that, for a fixed x ∈ R, the set Aa(x) represents the possible values
of a continuous control pa(x), and similarly for Ab(x). It is also easy to see that, for any measurable v, the
functions P a(v) and P b(v) are measurable, hence, they belong to Aa and Ab, respectively (i.e. P a(v) and
P b(v) are admissible continuous controls). The following proposition, whose proof is given in the appendix,
allows us to reduce the control-stopping problem of an agent to a fixed point problem, associated with optimal
stopping and feedback control.
Proposition 6. Let σ > 0 be sufficiently large, so that Proposition 2 holds with w < 1. Consider any pb ∈ Ab
and any admissible barrier v, both satisfying the 1-shift property and such that v′(x) ≥ 1 − w > 0, for all
x ∈ R. Assume that there exists a measurable V a : R→ R, such that
V
a
(x) = sup
τ
Ja(x, τ, P a(V
a
), pb, v), ∀x ∈ R, (54)
and g
a
c (P
a(V
a
)(·), pb(·), ·) is C-close to x. Then,
V
a
(x) = sup
pa∈Aa, τ
Ja(x, τ, pa, pb, v), ∀x ∈ R. (55)
Analogous statement holds for (V
b
, Jb, P b(V
b
)).
Remark 2. Note that it is easier to prove the converse statement: i.e., V a, defined by (55), satisfies (54).
However, it does not imply the statement of the proposition, as there may exist multiple solutions to (54). For
the subsequent results, it is important to show that any solution to (54) satisfies (55).
Proposition 6 allows us to sidestep the optimization over pa or pb, in the definitions of V a and V b, respec-
tively, by using the feedback controls P a and P b throughout.
Next, we notice that Assumption 1, in particular, implies that the optimal feedback prices are always C ′0 =
C0 + 1-close to x, and also inherit the 1-shift property from the barriers they correspond to. This observation
is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Let
pa(x) := P a(v)(x), pb(x) := P b(v)(x), ∀x ∈ R,
for some admissible barrier v. Then, for all x ∈ R,
|pa(x)− x| ≤ C ′0, |pb(x)− x| ≤ C ′0,
∣∣∣ga/b(x)/c(x)∣∣∣ ≤ C ′0.
If, in addition, v has 1-shift property, then so do pa and pb.
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Proof:
From the definition (53) and the fact that supp ξ ⊂ [−C0, C0], it is easy to see that pa(x) − x must be no
smaller than the largest integer ≤ −C0 and no larger than the smallest integer ≥ C0. Hence,
pa(x) ≥ x− C ′0, pa(x) ≤ x+ C ′0.
Similar conclusion holds for pb(x). From (3), (4) we obtain∣∣∣∣gac (x)− x
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ (pa(x)− x) (1− F (pa(x)− x)) + Fb(pb(x), x)− xF (pb(x)− x)(1− F (pa(x)− x)) + F (pb(x)− x)
∣∣∣∣ .
An analogous statement holds for gb. Thus, to prove the claim, it suffices to show
|pa(x)− x| ≤ C ′0, |Fb(pb(x), x)− x| ≤ C ′0 F (pb(x)− x).
The first inequality has already been established. For the second one, we have
Fb(pb(x), x)− x =
∫ pb(x)−x
−∞
bx+ αyc − x dF (y)
To finish the proof, we notice that
|bx+ αyc − x| ≤ C ′0,
when y ∈ supp ξ (as dF (y) = 0 otherwise). The claim for gb/c can be proven analogously. The 1-shift
property of pa and pb, given that v satisfies it, is immediate from (53).
In view of the above lemma, it is natural to choose C ′0 as the constant C, appearing in “C-close to x”
property. Note that C ′0 satisfies (12).
Next, for any admissible barriers (va, vb), we define
Φ(va, vb) =
(
V a
(·, P a(va), P b(vb), vb) , V b(·, P a(va), P b(vb), va)) . (56)
Lemmas 2 and 9 imply that the components of Φ are admissible barriers, and we can iterate this mapping. In
fact, we are only interested in the restriction of Φ to the sets A0 and A0(w), defined below.
Definition 4. The set A0 consists of all continuous real-valued functions on R, which are C ′0-close to x and
satisfy the 1-shift property. For any w ≥ 0, we say that v ∈ A0(w), if v ∈ A0, v is absolutely continuous, and
1− w ≤ v′ ≤ 1 + w a.e.. We equip A0 and A0(w) with the topology of uniform convergence on all compacts.
Lemmas 1, 2, and 9, show that Φ maps A0 × A0 into itself. In addition, Proposition 4 shows that Φ maps
A0×A0 intoA0(w)×A0(w), where w can be chosen to be arbitrarily small for sufficiently large σ > 0. Using
Proposition 6, we show, below, that a fixed point of this mapping in the appropriate subset gives a solution to
the system (9). Hence, our next goal is to establish the existence of such a fixed point. The first step is to
show that Φ is continuous on A0(w) × A0(w), for w < 1. To this end, we, first, choose the appropriate
space and topology for the feedback price controls P a(v) and P b(v), and show that they are continuous in
v ∈ A0(w). Then, we show that V a
(·, pa, pb, v) and V b (·, pa, pb, v) are continuous as operators acting on
functions (pa, pb), with respect to the chosen topology, uniformly in v ∈ A0. This, together with the continuity
of V a
(·, pa, pb, v) and V b (·, pa, pb, v) in v, established in Proposition 5, yields the continuity of Φ.
Let us define the space for the feedback price controls.
Definition 5. Denote by Ba0 and Bb0 the subspaces of Aa and Ab, respectively, consisting of all functions that
are C ′0-close to x and satisfy the 1-shift property. We equip B
a/b
0 with the topology induced by their natural
restriction to L1([0, 1]) (in view of the 1-shift property).
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Note that P a(v) ∈ Ba0 and P b(v) ∈ Bb0, for any v ∈ A0. The following, somewhat tricky, lemma is the
first one of the two remaining results we need to establish the continuity of Φ.
Lemma 10. For any w ∈ [0, 1), the mappings
v 7→ P a(v), v 7→ P b(v),
from A0(w) into Ba0 and B
b
0, respectively, are continuous.
Proof:
We only show the P a version, the P b one being analogous. The proof consists of two steps. First, we
show that, given v, with the properties described in the statement of the lemma (in particular, v is increasing),
P a(v)(x) is also an increasing function of x. Then, we use this monotonicity property to show the desired
continuity of P a.
Step 1. For a fixed v, we denote px = P a(v)(x). Assume, to the contrary, that for some x1 > x2 we have
px1 < px2 . Note that the set of admissible control values,Aa(x), shifts upward when x increases. Therefore, if
px2 is an admissible control value at x = x2 < x1, and px2 > px1 , with px1 being an admissible control value
at x = x1, then px2 is an admissible control value at x = x1. Similarly, if px1 < px2 , then px1 is admissible
at x = x2. Thus, to obtain a contradiction, it suffices to show that px2 yields a better local objective value than
px1 , at x = x1: i.e.
(px2 − v(x1))F+(px2 − x1) > (px1 − v(x1))F+(px1 − x1). (57)
The above inequality, clearly, holds if px1 ≤ v(x1). Hence, without loss of generality, we assume px1 > v(x1).
Then, (57) is equivalent to:
px2 − v(x1)
px1 − v(x1)
>
F+(px1 − x1)
F+(px2 − x1)
(58)
Note that
(px2 − v(x2))F+(px2 − x2) ≥ (px1 − v(x2))F+(px1 − x2), (59)
due to the fact that px2 is the optimal price at x = x2 and, hence, is not worse than px1 (which is admissible at
x = x2). The assumption px1 > v(x1) also implies that px2 > v(x2), as v(x2) < v(x1). Hence, the inequality
(59) is equivalent to
px2 − v(x2)
px1 − v(x2)
≥ F
+(px1 − x2)
F+(px2 − x2)
(60)
To get the desired contradiction, it suffices to notice that
px2 − v
px1 − v
= 1 +
px2 − px1
px1 − v
is strictly increasing in v ∈ R, for v < px1 , and that
F+(px1 − x)
F+(px2 − x)
is decreasing in x. The former is obvious, while the latter follows from
∂
∂x
(
F+(px1 − x)
F+(px2 − x)
)
=
f(px1 − x)F+(px2 − x)− f(px2 − x)F+(px1 − x)
F+ (px2 − x)2
=
f(px1 − x)f(px2 − x)
F+ (px2 − x)2
(
F+
f
(px2 − x)−
F+
f
(px1 − x)
)
≤ 0,
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which, in turn, follows from the fact that F+/f is decreasing, by Assumption 1. Given the above monotonicity
properties of the terms in (60), we deduce (58), thus, obtaining the desired contradiction and proving the
monotonicity of P a(v)(·).
Step 2. One can easily check that P a(v1) ≥ P a(v2), if v1(x) ≥ v2(x) for all x. To show that P a(v1) and
P a(v2) are close in the topology of Ba0 , it suffices to show that∫ 1
0
|P a(v1)− P a(v2)| dx
is small. Note that the monotonicity and the 1-shift property of the integer-valued function P a(v2) (cf. Lemma
9) imply that it coincides with bx−α2c, for x ∈ [0, 1] (except, possibly, the jump points of the latter function),
for some α2. Similar conclusion holds for P a(v1), with some α1. W.l.o.g. we assume that α1 ≥ α2, and,
hence, v2 ≥ v1. Assume that v1 and v2 are also δ-close in sup-norm, so that we have v2 ≤ v1 + δ. If we can,
moreover, show that
α1 ≤ α2 + δ
1− w, (61)
then, a straightforward calculation would yield∫ 1
0
|P a(v1)− P a(v2)| dx = O(δ).
Thus, it remains to show (61). To this end, we note that, due to the definition of A0(w), for every x ∈ R, there
exists x∗ ∈ [x, x+ δ/(1− w)], such that v1(x∗) = v2(x). Assuming that
P a(v1)(x∗) < P a(v2)(x),
and recalling that x∗ ≥ x and v1(x∗) = v2(x), we follow the arguments in Step 1 to obtain a contradiction.
Thus,
P a(v1)(x∗) ≥ P a(v2)(x),
which implies (61).
The following lemma, whose proof is given in the appendix, provides the last result we need in order to
show the continuity of Φ. Recall the definition of (Ja0 , J
b
0) and (V
a
0 , V
b
0 ), given in (17)–(20).
Lemma 11. The operators (pa, pb) 7→ · + V a0 (·, pa, pb, v), · + V b0 (·, pa, pb, v), from Ba0 × Bb0 into A0, are
continuous, uniformly over v ∈ A0.
Finally, we can state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. Let σ be sufficiently large so that w, defined in Proposition 4, is strictly less than one. Then, the
set A := A0(w) × A0(w) is a compact closed convex subset of C(R) × C(R), with the topology of uniform
convergence on all compacts. Moreover, the mapping Φ, defined in (56), is a continuous mapping of A into
itself, and it has a fixed point.
Proof:
The fact that Φ mapsA into itself, for sufficiently large σ, is discussed in the paragraph following Definition
4. The closeness and convexity of A are also clear. The compactness of A follows from the compactness of
A0(w). In turn, A0(w) is compact because of the uniform Lipschitz property of its elements and their uniform
closeness to x. Finally, Φ is continuous because it can be written as a composition of
E : (va, vb) 7→ (va, vb, P a(va), P b(vb))
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and
V : (va, vb, pa, pb) 7→ (V a(·, pa, pb, vb), V b(·, pa, pb, va)) .
In the above, E : A → A × Ba0 × Bb0 is continuous by Lemma 10. The operator V : A × Ba0 × Bb0 → A is
continuous, as it is continuous in (pa, pb) ∈ Ba0 × Bb0, uniformly over va, vb ∈ A0(w), by Lemma 11, and it
is continuous in va, vb ∈ A0(w), due to Proposition 5 and the 1-shift property of the elements of A0(w). The
existence of a fixed point of Φ follows from the Schauder fixed point theorem.
Combining the above theorem with Proposition 6, we obtain the proof of Theorem 1 (compare (56), (54),
(55) and (9)).
5 Numerical example and applications
In this section, we consider a numerical example which illustrates the properties of equilibria constructed in
the preceding sections and shows their potential applications. As described in the proof of Theorem 2, to
compute equilibrium value functions (V¯ a, V¯ b), we need to find a fixed point of a mapping V ◦ E. Notice that
Aa(x)/Ab(x) are finite sets, which become sufficiently small under realistic assumptions on model parameters
(σ, λ, F, α). Hence, E can be easily computed by a simple grid search, and we only need to figure out how to
compute V. The latter is equivalent to computing a value function of a stationary optimal stopping problem
with running costs and discounting. The algorithm we use to compute this value function is described below,
and it constitutes a simple application of the Markov chain approximation methods developed in [16].
Let N be a positive integer which controls the space and time discretization, and define
h :=
1
N
, ∆t :=
h2
σ2
.
Let ξn be a symmetric random walk on {nh}n∈Z. It is easy to check that the conditional first and second
moments of ξn+1 − ξn approximate X(n+1)∆t −Xn∆t, and, hence, ξ can be thought of as an approximation
of X , where each step of ξ is considered to take time ∆t. We, then, consider the associated discretization of
the optimal stopping problems (14), (15), for the approximating Markov chain ξ, and denote the corresponding
value functions by V aN (x, p
a, pb, v) and V bN (x, p
a, pb, v). It is known (cf. [16]) that V a/bN (x, p
a, pb, v) →
V a/b(x, pa, pb, v), as N →∞, and that V aN satisfies the following dynamic programming equation:
V aN (x, p
a, pb, v) = max
[
bv(x)c, 1
1 + cp(x)∆t
(
V aN (x− h) + V aN (x+ h)
2
)
+
cp(x)∆t
1 + cp(x)∆t
gap(x),
]
(62)
and similarly for V bN . The solution to this equation can be found via the usual iteration in value space. That is,
if we replace V aN with the n-th step approximation V
a
N,n, in the right hand side of (62), and with V
a
N,n+1, in its
left hand side, then V aN,n → V aN as n→∞. Note that, to describe an equilibrium (more precisely, its approxi-
mation), we need to find V¯ aN = V
a
N (·, P a(V aN ), P b(V bN ), V bN ) and V¯ bN = V bN (·, P a(V aN ), P b(V bN ), V aN ), where
each V a/bN solves the associated dynamic programming equation (62). To solve the resulting coupled system,
we start with initial (V aN,0, V
b
N,0, p
a
N,0, p
b
N,0), use it to obtain V
a
N,1, as described above (i.e. by computing the
right hand side of (62), with (V aN,0, V
b
N,0, p
a
N,0, p
b
N,0)), compute p
a
N,1 = P
a(V aN,1) via (53), then, compute V
b
N,1
given (V aN,1, V
b
N,0, p
a
N,1, p
b
N,0), and so on. If the resulting sequence converges, the limiting function satisfies
the definition of (V¯ aN , V¯
b
N ).
Although the theoretical convergence results of [16] do not quite apply for the coupled system at hand,
numerically, we do observe convergence of the proposed scheme for the values of σ that are not too small, as
suggested by Theorem 1. The left hand side of Figure 1 shows a typical graph of the (approximated) equilibrium
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value functions (V¯ aN , V¯
b
N ). Its right hand side contains the associated bid and ask prices (p
a = P a(V¯ aN ), p
b =
P b(V¯ bN )). The parameter values are as follows: f(x) = 1[−γ,γ](x)/(2γ), γ = 1.2, α = 0.9, λ = 1, σ = 1,
N = 100. Due to the 1-shift property of both values and prices, one can easily extend these graph beyond
the range x ∈ [0, 1]: the value of these functions at x + n is obtained by shifting their values at x up by n.
We can observe several properties of the equilibrium value functions and quotes that can be deduced from the
construction of equilibrium in the preceding sections.
• First, the value functions V¯ a/b are monotone and Lipschitz in x. This follows from the fact that they
belong to A0(w) (cf. Definition 4), by Theorem 2.
• At the points where the two value functions coincide (and, hence, the game stops), they take integer
values. This follows from the arguments presented in the proof of Proposition 1 and in the paragraph
preceding equation (9).
• The two-dimensional stochastic process (V¯ a(Xt), V¯ b(Xt)) evolves on a one-dimensional manifold (as
X is one-dimensional), which is shown in red on Figure 2.
• The quotes, pa/b, take only integer values by construction, and they are non-decreasing as shown in the
proof of Lemma 10. In addition, pa/b(x) can change at most once in the interval x ∈ (0, 1), as follows
from the 1-shift property.
• The ask quote, pa(x), never falls below V¯ a(x), and the bid quote, pb(x), never rises above V¯ b(x), as
follows from the definition of the feedback functionals in (53). Since the open interval (V¯ a(x), V¯ b(x))
does not contain any integers (see the paragraph preceding (9)), we have pa(x) ≥ pb(x).
• Finally, if pa(x) = dxe and pb(x) = bxc (which is expected for markets with a single-tick spread), the
value functions always cross: V¯ a(x) ≤ V¯ b(x). To see this, notice that, in the equilibrium we construct,
the two agents stop at the same time τ , hence, their payoffs are given by
Ua/bτ
(
pa(Xτ ), dV¯ a(Xτ )e, pb(Xτ ), bV¯ b(Xτ )c
)
(see (7) and (2)). As V¯ a(Xτ ) = V¯ b(Xτ ), the desired inequality follows from ga(pa(x), pb(x), x) ≤
gb(pa(x), pb(x), x) (see (4), (5)), which, in turn, follows from∫ ∞
dxe−x
dx+ αyedF (y) ≥ dxe (1− F (dxe − x)) ,
∫ bxc−x
−∞
bx+ αycdF (y) ≤ bxcF (bxc − x) .
It is worth mentioning that, in the equilibrium shown in Figure 1, the value functions coincide, and the
game stops, when X hits zero or one. In general, this does not have to be the case, and numerical experiments
reveal the existence of equilibria with different stopping boundaries (even though the stopping region is always
1-periodic).
Let us now discuss the implications of the last property in the above list, which illustrate the potential
applications of the proposed model. As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that the value functions of
strategic agents cross, i.e. V¯ a(Xt) ≤ V¯ b(Xt), before the game ends is due to the presence of a positive tick
size. Without the friction caused by the latter, the two strategic agents would trade with each other at any
price level in [V¯ a(Xt), V¯ b(Xt)], and the game would end. However, in the present model, the agents may
not be able to trade because there may not exist an admissible price level (i.e. an integer) lying between their
continuation values. The size of the value crossing, i.e., V¯ b − V¯ a, measures the inefficiency created by the
positive tick size. Namely, if the two players were offered to trade with each other in a “shadow market”,
without a tick size, the maximum fee they would be willing to pay for such an opportunity is precisely equal
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Figure 1: On the left: value functions (V¯ bN , V¯
a
N ) as functions of X . On the right: posted prices (p
a, pb), as
functions of X .
to the size of the crossing. The proposed model allows us to compute the maximum value of such inefficiency,
throughout the game, which corresponds to the maximum difference between the red and blue curves in Figure
1, and to the maximum deviation of the red curve from the diagonal in Figure 2. This measure of inefficiency
is plotted on Figure 3 as a function of tick size. Remarkably, this function appears to be super-linear, which,
in particular, means that the size of the inefficiency is not simply proportional to the tick size. Notice that any
change in the tick size has a dual effect on the market. On the one hand, under the natural assumption that the
game always stops when X hits a multiple of the tick size,6 as in Figure 1, we conclude that the duration of
the game is increasing with the tick size. Thus, an increase in the tick size has a positive effect on the market
liquidity: the strategic agents withdraw liquidity less frequently. On the other hand, as the inefficiency caused
by a positive tick size increases, the strategic agents are more tempted to leave the game altogether and trade
at an alternative market with a smaller tick size, even if they pay a fee for such a transition. The equilibrium
model developed herein allows one to quantify these two effects, which, for example, can be used by policy
makers when making decisions on regulating the tick size in financial exchanges.
6 Appendix.
6.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Subtracting x from V
a
and Ja, as in (19) and (17), we reformulate the claim for the relative versions, V
a
0 =
V
a− x and Ja0 = Ja− x in lieu of V
a
and Ja. To prove the claim, we need to verify that the feedback control
pa = P a(V
a
) is optimal. The latter, in turn, requires a differential characterization of the value function
V a0 (x, p
a, pb, bvc) = sup
τ
Ja0 (x, τ, p
a, pb, bvc),
for any admissible control pa (cf. (19), (17)), along with a comparison principle allowing us to compare the
candidate optimal control to an arbitrary one. We use the theory of variational inequalities (VIs) to implement
this program. Unfortunately, we could not locate any VI results that would be directly applicable in our setting,
due to the presence of unbounded domain, L∞ discount factor and running costs, and discontinuous obstacle.
6Numerical experiments indicate that this is the most likely equilibrium.
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Figure 2: In red: the curve
{
(V¯ a(x), V¯ b(x)) : x ∈ R}. In blue: the boundary of the set {(x, y) : x ≥
byc, y ≤ dye}. The left graph uses the same parameter values as in Figure fig:1.
Figure 3: The size of inefficiency caused by a positive tick size, as a function of tick size.
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Namely, to the best of our knowledge, there exist no results that would connect the solution to an optimal
stopping problem and the VI solution in such a setting. Thus, we need to introduce additional approximation
steps. More specifically, in Step 1, we show that the discontinuous barrier bvc can be replaced by its continuous
majorating approximation s, without affecting the value of the associated optimal stopping problem, no mat-
ter which admissible (pa, pb) are chosen. In Step 2, we choose a sequence of smooth approximating functions
vn ↓ s and use the continuity of VI solution w.r.t. the obstacle (cf. [3]), to show that the value function cor-
responding to s satisfies an appropriate VI. Finally, in Step 3 we use the comparison results for the associated
VI, to show that P a(V
a
) is indeed the optimal control.
Step 1. This step is taken care of by the following lemma, whose (geometric) proof is given below.
Lemma 12. Let (pa, pb) be admissible controls, and v an admissible barrier, such that (pa, pb, v) have 1-shift
property, ga/b/c are C-close to x, and v′ ≥ 1− w, with some fixed constant w < 1, and such that Proposition
2 holds with such w (the latter can be guaranteed by choosing a sufficiently large σ, due to Proposition 2).
Then, there exists a continuous piecewise linear function s ≥ bvc, independent of (pa, pb), which satisfies the
1-shift property, is C-close to x, and is such that
V a0 (·, pa, pb, bvc) = V a0 (·, pa, pb, s),
for any (pa, pb) satisfying the above properties.
Proof:
The main idea of the proof is to modify a step function around its jump points, by replacing jumps with
steep line segments, so that we do not affect its ‘mcm’. For notational convenience, let us introduce
fa0 (x, p
a, pb) := fa(x, pa, pb)− x =
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c(Xs, p
a(Xs), p
b(Xs))ds
)(
ga(pa(Xt), p
b(Xt), Xt)− c(pa(Xt), pb(Xt), Xt)Xt
)
dt
]
.
(63)
Then, by Proposition 3, we have:
V a0 (x, p
a, pb, v˜) = fa0 (x) + φ(x) mcm
(
̂v˜ − fa0 − x
)
(F(x)) ,
where the only dependence on the obstacle v˜ is inside the ‘mcm’, and V a0 is defined in (19). Thus, it suffices
to show that mcm
(
̂v˜ − fa0 − x
)
(y) does not change if we replace v˜ = bvc by v˜ = s.
Let us fix any  > 0 and define s. We know that bvc has the 1-shift property and changes only by jumps
of size 1, at a sequence of points {x0 + n}n∈Z. We define s(x) to be equal to bv(x)c outside the intervals
(x0 + n − , x0 + n], and to coincide with the line segment connecting (x0 + n − , bv (x0 + n− )c) and
(x0 +n, bv (x0 + n)c) on these intervals. Notice that, in the left -neighborhood of every jump point of bvc, s
is a line segment with slope 1/, and it coincides with bvc (and is locally constant) elsewhere. Notice also that
s ≥ bvc by construction, hence, mcm
(
̂s − fa0 − x
)
≥ mcm
(
̂bvc − fa0 − x
)
, and it only remains to prove
the opposite inequality, for some  > 0.
To this end, we notice that, under the assumptions of the lemma, fa0 + x is strictly increasing, and, hence,
the function x 7→ bv(x)c − fa0 (x) − x achieves its maximum value exactly at the points {x0 + n}. If this
maximum is non-positive, we deduce from the proof of Proposition 4 that mcm
(
̂bvc − fa0 − x
)
= 0. Then,
the desired inequality is clear, as we can ensure that s − fa0 − x has the same supremum as bvc − fa0 − x,
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by choosing sufficiently small  > 0 (depending only on w, due to Proposition 2). Thus, for the remainder of
the proof, we assume that the supremum of bvc − fa0 − x is strictly positive, which implies that its ‘mcm” is
strictly positive everywhere.
Denote y0 := F(x0), y1 := F(x1), where x1 = x0 + 1 and F is given by (39). Notice that (fa0 )
′ ≥ 1−w,
with some fixed w < 1. Then, using the estimates of (ψ, φ) given in Lemma 4, it is easy to deduce that there
exists δ ∈ (0, 1], independent of (pa, pb, v), and y′0 ∈ [y0,F(x1 − δ)], such that ̂(bvc − fa0 − x)(y′0) > 0
and the linear interpolation of the points (y′0, ̂(bvc − fa0 − x)(y′0)) and (y1, ̂(bvc − fa0 − x)(y1)) lies above
the graph of ̂bvc − fa0 − x on the interval [y′0, y1]. Our goal is to show that this interpolation also dominates
̂s − fa0 − x on this interval, for all small enough  > 0. Clearly, if  < δ, then, the function ̂bvc − fa0 − x,
modified by the aforementioned interpolation on [y′0,F(x0 + 1)], dominates ̂s − fa0 − x on [F(x0),F(x0 +
1)]. Then, due to periodicity, analogous modification can be constructed on any [F(x0 + n),F(x0 + n +
1)], to dominate ̂s − fa0 − x on this interval, which yields the desired inequality: mcm
(
̂s − fa0 − x
)
≤
mcm
(
̂bvc − fa0 − x
)
.
Notice that the ‘ ·̂ ’ operator (defined in (40)) transforms any linear combination of φ and ψ into a straight
line. Therefore, it suffices to prove that s − fa0 − x is dominated on [x′0 := F−1(y′0), x1] by ‘aφ(x) + bψ(x)’
interpolation between (x′0, z
′
0) and (x1, z1) (with the constants a and b chosen to match the boundary values z
′
0
and z1, at x′0 and x1, respectively), where
z′0 = bv(x′0)c − fa0 (x′0)− x′0, z1 = bv(x1)c − fa0 (x1)− x1.
Denote h = aφ+ bψ, and observe: h(x′0) = z
′
0 ∈ [(z1 − 1)+, z1], h(x1) = z1 > 0, x1 ≥ x′0 + δ, and h ≥ 0,
h ≥ bvc − fa0 − x on [x′0, x1]. Next, as h satisfies
σ2
2
hxx − ch = 0, a.e.,
and is continuously differentiable, we apply the maximum principle to conclude that the maximum value of h
on [x′0, x1] cannot be achieved in the interior of this interval (otherwise, at the maximum point, we would have
h > 0 and hxx < 0, which is a contradiction with the above equation). Thus, h(x) ≤ z1 for x ∈ [x′0, x1].
Then, the above equation implies
0 ≤ hxx(x) ≤ 2c
σ2
z1 ≤ 2cu
σ2
z1, x ∈ [x′0, x1],
and, as the integral of hx over the interval [x′0, x1] (of length at least δ ∈ (0, 1] and at most 1) does not exceed
1, we conclude:
hx(x) ≤ 2cu
σ2
z1 +
1
δ
, x ∈ [x′0, x1].
The assumptions of the lemma imply that bvc is (C + 1)-close to x and that fa0 is absolutely bounded by C.
Therefore, z1 = bv(x1)c − x1 − fa0 (x1) ≤ 2C + 1, and, in turn, hx is bounded on [x′0, x1] by a constant
C2, independent of (pa, pb, v), as long as the latter satisfy the properties stated in the lemma. Finally, notice
that h(x1) = z1 = s(x1) − x1 − fa0 (x1), and that the slope of the function s − fa0 − x is at least as large
as 1/ − 1 − w on [x1 − , x1] (due to Proposition 2). Then, we can choose  to be small enough, so that
1/− 1− w ≥ C2 ≥ hx(x), for x ∈ [x1 − , x1]. Thus, we obtain
s(x)− fa0 (x)− x ≤ h(x), x ∈ [x1 − , x1].
As h ≥ bvc − fa0 − x on [x′0, x1], by construction, we conclude that the above inequality holds for all x ∈
[x′0, x1]. Thus, we conclude that the function ̂bvc − fa0 − x, modified by its linear interpolation on [y′0, y1],
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dominates ̂s − fa0 − x on [y0 = F(x0), y1 = F(x0 + 1)]. The other intervals [F(x0 + n),F(x0 + n+ 1)] are
handled by the same argument. As a result, we obtain
mcm
(
̂s − fa0 − x
)
≤ mcm
(
̂bvc − fa0 − x
)
,
which yields the desired equality between the left and the right hand sides of the above.
Step 2. Let us recall some notation from [3]. Let µ > 0 and consider the weight function
mµ(x) = exp(−µ|x|).
Denote by Hµ = W0,2,µ, Vµ = W1,2,µ the appropriate mµ-weighted Sobolev spaces on R (we need weighted
spaces because our coefficients are bounded and periodic, while we need them to be integrable over the entire
unbounded domain). For any u, r ∈ Vµ and any p ∈ Aa, we define
ap(u, r) =
∫
R
σ2
2
m2µu
′r′ − 2µ sign(x)σ
2
2
mµv
′mµr + cpm2µur dx.
Let fp ∈ Hµ, given by
fp(x) = g
a
p(x)− cp(x)x,
be the running cots of our relative-to-x stopping problem, and
Kµ(v) = {u ∈ Vµ|u(x) ≥ v(x)− x a.e. x}
be the appropriate set of test functions.
We denote by VI(p, v) the following VI (understood in the weak sense)
ap(u, r − u) ≤ (fp, r − u), ∀r ∈ Kµ(v) (64)
where
(u, r) = (u, r)µ =
∫
R
m2µurdx.
We say that u is a solution of the above VI if u ∈ Kµ(v) and u satisfies (64). As all the coefficients, cp, σ2/2,
fp, and (v − x), are in L∞(R), and as the form ap(·, ·) is coercive when µ is sufficiently small, we conclude
that (for such µ) the VI (64) has a unique solution in Kµ(v), for any p ∈ Aa and any v that is C-close to x, by
Theorem 1.13, [3] p. 217.
Let vn be a C∞-approximation from above of s, associated with v by Lemma 12, which is at most 1/n
away from s in sup-norm. Then, by Theorem 3.19, [3] p. 387, for sufficiently small µ, un = V a0 (·, p, pb, vn)
is the unique solution of VI(p, vn). Denote also by u0 the unique solution of VI(p, s). Rewriting these VIs as
unweighted VIs for mµu and restricting to a bounded domain, one can generalize Theorem 1.10, [3] p. 207, to
obtain un → u0 in L∞(R). The latter fact, together with the easy to check convergence of value functions,
V a0 (·, p, pb, vn)→ V a0 (·, p, pb, s) = V a0 (·, p, pb, bvc),
implies that the latter value function is the unique solution of VI(p, s).
Step 3. By Theorem 1.4, [3] p. 198, extended to unbounded domain as in Remark 1.21, p. 219, the unique
solutions u, u˜ ∈ Kµ(v) of VIs
ap(u, r − u) ≤ (h, r − u), ∀r ∈ Kµ(v)
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resp. ap(u˜, r − u˜) ≤ (h˜, r − u˜), ∀r ∈ Kµ(v)
sharing the obstacle v and the form ap, but with different right-hand sides h and h˜, satisfy u˜ ≥ u if h˜ ≥ h.
Recall that V
a
0(x) = V
a
(x) − x and denote p¯ := P a(V a). We need to show that the following inequality
holds:
u¯ := V
a
0 = V
a
0 (·, p¯, pb, bvc) = V a0 (·, p¯, pb, s) ≥ V a0 (·, p0, pb, s) = V a0 (·, p0, pb, bvc) =: u¯0 = u¯0(p0)
for any p0 ∈ Aa. It is shown in Step 2 that u¯ satisfies a version of (64) with the running costs fp¯ and the
quadratic form ap¯, which, after routine transformations, turns out to be equivalent to
ap0(u¯, r − u¯) ≤ (f˜ , r − u¯), ∀r ∈ Kµ(bvc), (65)
where f˜ = fp0 + q,
q := gp¯ − cp¯(u¯+ x)− (gp0 − cp0(u¯+ x)) ≥ 0,
which follows from p¯ = P a(V
a
) and u¯(x) + x = V
a
(x). Recall that u¯0 satisfies the above equation with the
running cost function fp0 in place of f˜ , and that fp0 ≤ f˜ . Hence, we can apply the comparison principle, stated
at the beginning of this step, to complete the proof.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 11
We only show the continuity of (pa, pb) 7→ x+ V a0 (x, pa, pb, v), the other part being analogous. Recall that
V a0 (x, p
a, pb, v) = sup
τ
Ja0 (x, τ, p
a, pb, v).
Thus, it suffices to show that Ja0 -s corresponding to two close pairs of prices, (p
a
1 , p
b
1) and (p
a
2 , p
b
2), with the
same τ , are also close, uniformly in τ . To this end, we recall (17) and obtain
Ja0 (x, τ, p
a
1 , p
b
1, v)− Ja0 (x, τ, pa2 , pb2, v)
= Ex
[ ∫ τ
0
(
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c1(Xs)ds
)
− exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c2(Xs)ds
))
(ga1 (Xt)− c1(Xt)Xt) dt
+
∫ τ
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c2(Xs)ds
)
(ga1 (Xt)− c1(Xt)Xt − (ga2 (Xt)− c2(Xt)Xt)) dt
+
(
exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c1(Xs)ds
)
− exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c2(Xs)ds
))
(v(Xτ )−Xτ )
]
, (66)
where we denote
c1(x) = c(p
a
1(x), p
b
1(x), x), c2(x) = c(p
a
2(x), p
b
2(x), x),
ga1 (x) = g
a(pa1(x), p
b
1(x), x), g
a
2 (x) = g
a(pa2(x), p
b
2(x), x).
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the expectations of the absolute values of each of the three terms
on different lines in (66) are small when (pa1 , p
b
1) and (p
a
2 , p
b
2) are close in their topology.
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For the third term, note that, as | exp(−x)− exp(−y)| ≤ max (exp(−x), exp(−y)) |x−y|, and as ci(x) ≥
cl > 0, for all x and i = 1, 2, we have∣∣∣∣(exp(−∫ τ
0
c1(Xs)ds
)
− exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
c2(Xs)ds
))
(v(Xτ )−Xτ )
∣∣∣∣ ≤
exp(−clτ)
(∫ τ
0
|c1(Xs)− c2(Xs)| ds
)
|v(Xτ )−Xτ | ≤ C1
∫ τ
0
exp(−cls) |c1(Xs)− c2(Xs)| ds ≤
C1
∫ τ
0
exp(−cls)
(|pa1(Xs)− pa2(Xs)|+ ∣∣pb1(Xs)− pb2(Xs)∣∣) ds,
where a positive constant C1 may differ between the lines (here and throughout the proof). The second inequal-
ity in the above follows from the closeness to x of v, and the last one follows from the fact that
c(pa, pb, x) = λ
(
F+(pa − x) + F (pb − x))
is Lipschitz in (pa, pb), as the density of ξ is bounded by Assumption 1.
Similarly, it is easy to show that, for all x ∈ R,
|(ga1 (x)− c1(x)x− (ga2 (x)− c2(x)x)| ≤ C1
(|pa1(x)− pa2(x)|+ ∣∣pb1(x)− pb2(x)∣∣) ,
using the boundedness of the density of ξ and the uniform closeness of all admissible pa, pb to x. This allows
us to estimate the second term in (66):∣∣∣∣∫ τ
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c2(Xs)ds
)
(ga1 (Xt)− c1(Xt)Xt − (ga2 (Xt)− c2(Xt)Xt)) dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤
C1
∫ τ
0
exp(−clt)
(|pa1(Xt)− pa2(Xt)|+ ∣∣pb1(Xt)− pb2(Xt)∣∣) dt.
Finally, we notice that |ga1 (Xt)− c1(Xt)Xt| ≤ C1, which follows from the fact that ga1/c1 is C ′0-close to
x (cf. Lemma 9) and that c1 ≤ cu. This allows us to estimate the first term in (66):∣∣∣∣∫ τ
0
(
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c1(Xs)ds
)
− exp
(
−
∫ t
0
c2(Xs)ds
))
(ga1 (Xt)− c1(Xt)Xt) dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤
C1
∫ τ
0
exp(−clt)
(∫ t
0
(|pa1(Xs)− pa2(Xs)|+ ∣∣pb1(Xs)− pb2(Xs)∣∣) ds) dt ≤
C1
∫ τ
0
exp(−clt)
(|pa1(Xt)− pa2(Xt)|+ ∣∣pb1(Xt)− pb2(Xt)∣∣) dt,
where the second inequality follows from integration by parts, after discarding some negative terms.
Thus, the absolute values of all terms in (66) are estimated from above via∫ τ
0
exp(−clt)
(|pa1(Xt)− pa2(Xt)|+ ∣∣pb1(Xt)− pb2(Xt)∣∣) dt
≤
∫ ∞
0
exp(−clt)
(|pa1(Xt)− pa2(Xt)|+ ∣∣pb1(Xt)− pb2(Xt)∣∣) dt,
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which implies∣∣V a0 (x, pa1 , pb1, v)− V a0 (x, pa2 , pb2, v)∣∣
≤ C1Ex
[∫ ∞
0
exp(−clt)
(|pa1(Xt)− pa2(Xt)|+ ∣∣pb1(Xt)− pb2(Xt)∣∣) dt] .
It only remains to estimate the latter expectation in terms of L1 ([0, 1]) norms of pa1 − pa2 and pb1 − pb2. The
latter is achieved easily by interchanging the expectation and integration and using the standard estimates of a
Gaussian kernel.
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